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I.  EXPLANATORY  MEMORANDUM 
4 A.  INTRODUCTION 
1.  The Financial  Regulation of 21  December 1977  is  the  main instrument which, 
pursuant to the principles laid down in the Treaty (Articles 199 to 209), lays down 
rules for all aspects of  the budget of  the European Communities: 
- establishment: presentation of the preliminary draft by the Commission and 
adoption by the budgetary authority, 
- implementation  of  revenue  and  expenditure,  including  rules  on 
bookkeeping and presentation of  accounts, 
- definition of  the role and responsibility of those involved in implementation: 
authorising officers for revenue and expenditure, financial controller (internal 
auditor), accounting officer, 
- monitoring and control of implementation including presentation of financial 
data, control by the Court of Auditors (outside auditor) and by the European 
Parliament (discharge). 
2.  The present text of the Financial Regulation was adopted over twenty years ago, 
since  when  times  have  changed  enormously  'Yith  a  series  of enlargements, 
financial  perspectives  forming  a  framework  for  the development of the  budget 
(Delors I and II packages) and changes to the institutional structure resulting in 
the European Union.  The 1977 text has been amended repeatedly to take account 
of  the institutional changes (Maastricht, joint financing by the EFT  A countries for 
the  EEA)  and  also  to  tighten  up  the  management  of Community  finances,  a 
fundamental aspect of the Delors I package which comes up in  a number of the 
Court of  Auditors' observations. 
On this last point, the substantial revision of the Financial Regulation which is in 
the process of adoption by the Council ("seventh series" of amendments) will lay 
down the rules to  give effect to  the second phase of the SEM 2000 (sound  and 
efficient management)  programme.  The purpose of this  revision  is  to  impose 
stricter discipline  in  dealing with current commitments and lay down a clearer 
framework for delegation of powers and subcontracting of tasks connected with 
implementation of programmes; it also includes a first set of measures designed 
to  modernise bookkeeping and clarify the roles of authorising officer,  financial 
controller and accounting officer. 
It has to be admitted that all these amendments have robbed the 1977 text of some 
of  its coherence and readability. 
3.  The Court's opinion on the seventh series of amendments (4/97 of 10 July 1997)1 
was  not  confined  to  the  proposal  proper but  also  included  an  analysis  of the 
current state of the Financial Regulation and concluded that the time has come to 
propose a general overhaul of the Financial Regulation. 
OJ c 57, 23.2.1998, p.  1. 
5 The idea underlying the  Court's thinking  is  to  be  found  in  paragraph 14  of its 
opinion:  "as  a  result  of the  successive  proposals  for  revising  the  Financial 
Regulation, a good many 'facilities' have been arranged, or allowed to  emerge; 
these discretionary arrangements arc regarded as  useful for managers ...  but tend 
to  run counter to  a disciplined  approach and hugely complicate the  accounting 
and financial management". 
The Commission is aware of this problem.  It is prepared to embark on a general 
overhaul  of the  Financial  Regulation  and  to  present  a  proposal  which  takes 
account not  only of the  concerns  expressed  by the  Court  but  also  the  similar 
desires  frequently  expressed  by  the  Council  and  Parliament  in  the  discharge 
procedures.  This  would  also  be  an  opportunity  to  improve  the  clarity  and 
readability of  the Regulation. 
In  this  connection  the  Personal  Representatives  Group,  set  up  under  the 
SEM 2000  programme,  at  its  meeting  on  10 February 1998,  offered  its 
wholehearted support for the procedure and for the general approach suggested by 
the Commission. 
The proposal  for  the recasting of the  Financial  Regulation will  be  one of the 
legislative  items  accompanying  the  new  financial  perspective  for  2000-2006 
proposed  by  the  Commission  in  connection  with  Agenda 2000  reflecting  its 
desire for a budgetary policy that it both transparent and rigorous. 
B.  METHOD AND TIMET  ABLE 
4.  In view of  the technical complexity and scale ofthe task, which concerns all areas 
of Community activity and all the institutions, the Commission believes that the 
overhaul should be a two-stage process. 
The first  stage is this working paper, which is  intended to launch the broadest 
possible  interinstitutional  discussion  on  the  solutions  envisaged  by  the 
Commission  for  recasting  the  Financial  Regulation  and  allaying  the  Court's 
concern. 
On the basis of this interinstitutional discussion, the Commission will present a 
formal proposal in the first quarter of 1999 for adoption by the Council under the 
procedure laid down in Article 209 of the Treaty, i.e.  after the Court of Auditors 
and the European Parliament have given their opinions. 
This proposal for a general overhaul will be separate from the specific proposals 
currently pending, namely the "seventh series" (on which the Council has already 
reached  a  common  position)  and  the  "eighth  series"  ("Amsterdam-Euro", 
proposal presented by the Commission on 3 April 1998). 
C.  SUMMARY OF SOLUTIONS ENVISAGED BY THE COMMISSION 
6 5.  The Commission's approach is  to  make a distinction between the  problems of 
substance  and the problems of form  posed  by  the  Financial  Regulation  in its 
present state. 
The comments on matters of substance concern the following six topics which 
broadly correspond  to  the  topics  identified  by the  Court  of Auditors  and  arc 
discussed in detail in the second part of  this paper: 
statement of  the principles ofbudgctary law, 
- the system of  appropriations and the concept of  commitment, 
the definition "of accounting principles, 
- the rules on procurement, grants and subcontracting, 
a clearer definition of  the role of  the budget players, 
management of  external aid. 
The comments of form concern the following two topics which are discussed in 
detail in part three of  this paper.  Action on this front is essential from the point of 
view of  coherence of  the Regulation and readability for everyday users: 
improvement of  the presentation and clarity of  the Regulation, 
- improved coordination between the Financial Regulation and other instmments 
of  financial law. 
(a)  Matters of substance 
Topic One: Statement of the principles of budgetary law 
6.  The Commission believes that in this area there should be as  few  exceptions as 
possible  to  the  general  principles  and  only  where  they  can  be  justified  on 
objective grounds and hedged around by safeguards to prevent abuse. 
This is the approach also taken by the Court, which calls for strict application of 
the principles of budgetary law (paragraphs 4 and  16(a) of the opinion), which 
means imposing tight restrictions on the exceptions allowed (paragraph 1 of the 
annex to the opinion). 
7.  On  the  principle of unity,  the  Commission  suggests  the  following  solutions 
concerning the exceptions to this principle: 
- entry in the budget of the Funds and of borrowing and lending activities: 
even if the institutions are still unable to  agree on the question of entering the 
Funds  in  the  budget,  the  Commission  nonetheless  argues  for  more 
transparency in financial movements relating to  such activities, by producing 
appropriate information in the revenue and  expenditure account and balance 
sheet; 
7 - negative expenditure: the Court regards negative amounts, such as negative 
agricultural  expenditure,  as  a  breach  of  the  principle  of  unity.  The 
Commission believes that can be treated as amounts available for re-use or as 
revenue which, in the case of the supplementary levy and public storage costs, 
would be earmarked to  improving the situation on  the market in question in 
accordance  with  arrangements  whi~p could  be  laid  down  in  the  specific 
provisions for the EAGGF Guarantee ·section; 
- negative revenue: it is  the Commission's view that "negative revenue" is  an 
aspect of the calculation of own resources and does not constitute budgetary 
expenditure in the ordinary sense; 
negative  reserve:  the  Commission  sees  this  as  an  advance  estimate  of 
appropriations which will lapse, an instrument which the budgetary authority 
appreciates as an aid to its decisions during the procedure and the Commission 
therefore recommends that it be retained; 
integration  of the financing of the common foreign  and security policy 
(CFSP) and cooperation in the field of justice and home affairs (JHA): the 
Commission proposes stating expressly that the Financial Regulation applies to 
operational CFSP and JHA expenditure charged to the budget. 
8.  On the principle of universality, it is proposed that the exceptions of earmarked 
revenue  and  re-use  be  retained  but  in  a  more  rational  form.  The  Financial 
Regulation incorporates suitable safeguards for these exceptions which are not in 
fact criticised by the Court. 
9.  As  regards the  principle of specification, the  Commission takes  the view that 
without restricting the  freedom  of the budgetary authority  to  adopt the  budget 
with  an  appropriate  nomenclature,  a  minimum  framework  for  transfers  of 
. appropriations must be maintained.  In this connection the Commission suggests 
laying down uniform rules  for transfers of administrative appropriations for all 
the institutions. 
The Commission also suggests terminating the special arrangements for transfers 
of research appropriations for shared-cost action (Article 95) but maintaining the 
specific  arrangements  for  transfers  of  EAGGF  Guarantee  appropriations 
(Article 104). 
10.  The  existing  rules  and  even  the  Treaty allow  a  number  of exceptions  to  the 
principle  of :mnuality to  ensure  continuity  of management,  in  particular  the 
possibility of  carrying over appropriations in certain specific cases. 
Extension of the use of differentiated appropriations to  the entire budget should 
result in particular in the simplification of  the carryover arrangements.  Decisions 
on  all  carryovers  of  administrative  appropriations  would  be  taken  by  the 
budgetary  authority;  but  the  Commission  would  like  to  see  a  measure  of 
flexibility  in  this area for reasons of sound financial  management.  In order to 
maintain  the  necessary  continuity  in  management,  carryovers  of  Part B 
appropriations should  always be the  responsibility of the  Commission,  but the 
basic conditions should be set out in clearer and stricter terms. 
8 11.  As regards the principle of openness, it  is proposed that clearer infonnation be 
provided on budget implementation and that bookkeeping and the presentation of 
accounts  be  improved  by  highlighting  the  assets  position.  The  Commission 
suggests  strengthening  the  definition  of  the  principle  of  sound  financial 
management  and  including  a  reference  in  the  Financial  Regulation  to· 
evaluation, which at present receives only a mention in the Financial Regulation 
and  is  dealt  with  in  the  draft  amendments  of the  regulation  laying  down  the 
implementing rules for the Financial Regulation. 
Topic Two: The system of appropriations and the concept of commitment 
12.  The  Commission  agrees  with  the  Court  of  Auditors  that  differentiated 
appropriations,  which  are  designed  to  finance  multiannual  operations  while 
complying  with  the  principle  of annuality  as  regards  utilisation  of budget 
appropriations,  have  demonstrated  how  effective  they  can  be  to  finance  all 
operations  with  a  view  to  transparency  of commitments  and  payments  and 
monitoring of the payment schedule.  This approach would also  deal with the 
problem  of  multiannual  administrative  commitments,  for  instance  for  the 
purchase of  buildings. 
In this connection, EAGGF Guarantee expenditure which is currently financed 
via national departments or agencies under Article 98 of  the Financial Regulation, 
must be dealt with in a specific title containing appropriate provisions. 
As  regards  the  distinction  between  Part A  (administrative  appropriations) 
and Part B (appropriations for operations) in the Commission's section of the 
budget, a matter to which the Court devotes special attention, it is suggested that a 
Part A be retained to finance the administrative core of the Commission similar to 
the sections of the budget for the other institutions.  Part B would be confined to 
operations and to various items of  expenditure closely connected with operations, 
with  arrangements  for  presentation  and  monitoring  which  offer  greater 
transparency. 
The Commission believes that a more integrated approach leading eventually to a 
merging of  Part A and Part B, with a residual Part A for non-operational services, 
is  possible  only if the  budgetary  authority were  to  agree  that  budgetary rules 
should be based on an  integrated presentation of the allocation of financial  and 
administrative resources (activity-based budgeting); the matter would first have to 
be suitably analysed. 
As the Court of  Auditors points out, the Financial Regulation must also contain a 
clear definition of  the concept of  commitment. 
The  Commission  would  suggest  that  the  Financial  Regulation  should  define 
commitment in  its  various  components:  decision  (global  or specific  financing 
decision),  accounting  entry  (recording  of the  expenditure  in  the  accounts  and 
coverage of the expenditure by an  appropriation) and  legal  act  (measure giving 
rise to  the obligation to a third party).  The Financial Regulation should provide 
explicitly for  the  possibility of dividing  up  budget commitments under certain 
specific circumstances. 
9 Topic Three: Definition of accounting principles 
13.  As well as  developing assets accounting, the Commission also proposes laying 
down accounting principles (in particular continuity, prudence, permanence and 
comparability)  in  ·the  Financial  Regulation  to  reflect  generally  accepted 
accounting principles and  Community directives where they are relevant to  the 
public sector, and making the links between budget accounts and general accounts 
more coherent. 
This should provide the basis for evaluation as a means of meeting the objective 
of  sound  financial  management  in  the  form  of  "value  for  money"  and 
cost/effectiveness.  This  could  best  be  achieved  by the  eventual  adoption  of 
analytical accounting. 
As  regards  the  distinction  between  payments on  account and  advances,  the 
payment on account  would  be defined  as  a  definitive  but partial  payment not 
yielding interest for  the budget whereas the advance is  a cash transfer with any 
interest it may generate reverting to the budget.  In cases where funds continue to 
belong to  the Commission, the assignment of the interest yielded by such funds 
must  be  examined  on  a  case-by-case  basis,  but  the  objectives  of  sound 
management would require that it be allocated to the operation in connection with 
which it was generated. 
This  approach  takes  account  of  the  Court  of  Auditors'  opinion  which 
recommends improving the rules on accounting for  assets in the context of the 
shift of  the Community accounting system to assets accounts, a clear definition of 
advances  and  payments  on account with appropriate  accounting  treatment  and 
treatment of  interest. 
14.  As  regards  payment  times,  the  Commission  would  recall  that  it  undertook 
(SEC(97) 1205) to propose an amendment to the Financial Regulation setting the 
maximum  payment  period  at  60 days  and  enshrining  the  right  of the  unpaid 
creditor to claim interest after this period.  In this connection the Commission will 
take care to align its own payment times and interest due on what the proposal for 
a directive combating late payment in commercial transactions (COM(1998) 126 
final) imposes on national public authorities. 
Topic Four: Rules on  procurement. delegation of tasks to third parties and 
grants 
15.  In the field ofmles on procurement, the Commission intends first of all to clarify 
the scope of the agreement on government procurement concluded in the World 
Trade Organisation in respect of the institutions other than the Council and the 
Commission, which are signatories to the agreement. 
The Commission would then add that the ACPC provides horizontal supervision 
within the institution to ·check that authorising officers comply with the rules on 
the conclusion of contracts, in particular the directives on public contracts.  The 
first question concerns the retention of this horizontal control mechanism as part 
of  a move to bring authorising officers to assume more responsibility and to make 
procurement  subject  to  the  Community  directives.  The  next  question  is  the 
10 threshold for referral to  the Committee.  The Commission would point out that 
the  threshold  currently proposed  for  the regulation  laying  down  implementing 
mlcs for the Financial Regulation (ECU 120 000) corresponds roughly to what is 
set in the public contracts directives (130 000 special drawing rights).  It is  also 
possible;  as  the Court of Auditors wishes, that the threshold for referral to  the 
ACPC should be set in the Financial Regulation. 
The Commission would  also  suggest  laying  down  uniform  mles  for  contracts 
relating to JRC activities, subject to a period of review currently in progress, and 
to  consider the possibility of dropping the ACPC-JRC.  These contracts would 
then be referred to the ordinary ACPC, although it would be recognised that some 
expertise would have to be maintained in the field of  research. 
The Interinstitutional ACPC introduced in the Financial Regulation in 1990 but 
never actually  set  up  would be  dropped  and  replaced,  for  contracts  organised 
jointly by more than one institution, by assignment of  powers to the ACPC of the 
institution designated as lead institution.  · 
16.  In response to the requests from Parliament and the Court for stricter management 
of grants, the Commission suggests including a  specific title,  like the title on 
contracts, governing the award of grants and laying down across-the-board mles 
on openness,  award and effective management (ex  ante  and  ex post publicity, 
competition,  collective  assessment  and  principle  of non-exclusive  access  to 
grants). 
Topic Five: Clearer definition of the role of the nlayers 
17.  The  constant  growth  in  the  volume  of financial  work,  the  increasing  usc  of 
computers and, more recently, the implementation of the SEM 2000 programme 
with the aim of enhancing the responsibility of authorising officers all call for a 
clearer definition of  the role of  those involved in budget implementation. 
As a  result of the  SEM 2000 programme,  more  attention  is  being paid to  the 
responsibility of authorising officers, who conduct the first check of regularity 
of budget transactions.  The role of the  financial  controller is  to  ensure,  by 
means of an examination of systems or a sample check, that the management and 
check carried  out by  the  authorising  officers  satisfy  the  criteria  of regularity, 
legality and sound financial management. 
It  should be pointed  out  in  this  context  that  the  amendment of the  Financial 
Regulation  (seventh  series)  in  progress  will,  in  appropriate  cases,  authorise 
sample checks of both commitments and payments, with the financial controller 
always being in a position to restore systematic checks in risk areas. 
The responsibility of the accounting officer is linked more, since the introduction 
of the formal verification of accounts by the Court (DAS), to the assurance of the 
reliability  of the  accounts,  in  particular  as  regards  electronic  processing  of 
financial data.  This role is further reinforced by the Treaty of Amsterdam which 
makes the DAS one of the items to  be taken into account for the discharge.  In 
this  respect,  in  line  with  the  amendment of the  Financial  Regulation  (seventh 
series)  in  progress,  the  accounting  officer must  be  given  powers  to  check the 
11 quality and reliability of accounting systems set up by authorising officers.  The 
Commission notes that it enjoys the support ofthe Court in this field. 
Topic Six: Management of external aid 
18.  The provisions of Title IX must guarantee sound management of appropriations 
even where external aid is managed on a dccentralised basis.  The Commission 
suggests strengthening the provisions  on the conclusion of contracts  in  such a 
way as  to  eliminate any ambiguity about the application of the public contracts 
directives  and  the  Agreement on  Government Procurement  and  the concept of 
"contracts awarded in the interests ofthe Commission".  This is in response to the 
criticism of the Court of Auditors on the ambiguous wording of  the provisions on 
payments  and  contract  procedures.  Title IX will  also  have  to  be reviewed  to 
allow for decentralised management of  aid to countries applying for accession. 
(b)  Prohlems of form 
Topic One: Improving the presentation and clarity of the text 
19.  As  regards  the  structure of the  text:  the  Commission  suggests  dividing  the 
Regulation in  two parts, one containing the provisions constituting the ordinary 
law  (establishment  of the  budget,  implementation,  control,  accounts),  while 
special provisions (research, external aid, EAGGF, etc.) will be in the second part. 
It is also suggested that Title I,  concerning the general principles, adopt a more 
explanatory  approach  by  first  stating  the  principles  and  then  setting  out  the 
exceptions.  The drafting will be revised in the light of the Council resolution on 
the quality of drafting of Community legislation (elimination of repetitive parts, 
division into titles, chapters, sections, articles and paragraphs). 
20.  Imprecise wording: the  Commission believes that  ambiguous expressions ("in 
principle", "in particular", "as a mle", etc.) should be removed except where they 
concern  an  exception  to  a  principle,  an  example  required  for  the  sake  of 
explanation or the difficulty of  defining a de facto situation in legal terms. 
21.  Harmonisation of terms: in reply to  the Court's comment that the terminology 
must  be  scrupulously  standardised,  harmonisation  of the  t.erms  used  in  the 
Financial  Regulation  is  suggested  for  the  concept  of commitment  (decision, 
accounting  and  legal),  submission  or  transmission  of  documents  and  the 
responsibility of  the financial controller. 
22.  Finally  the  discrepancies  between  the  different  language  versions  of the 
Financial  Regulation  have  been  identified  by  the  Court  of Auditors  and  the 
Commission's Translation Service and will be examined by the lawyer-linguists 
on  completion  of the  procedure  for  the  adoption  of the  proposal  that  the 
Commission will be presenting on the basis of  this working paper. 
I!!pic  Two:  Better  links  between  the  Financial  Regulation  and  other 
instruments of budgetary Jaw 
12 23. 
24. 
D. 
25. 
2 
Relationship  between  the  Financial  Regulation  and  the  Treaty  or  the 
implementing rules for the Financial Regulation:2 while respecting the need 
for  clear  explanations  and  coherence  of the  text,  the  Commission  proposes 
retaining the repetition of provisions of the Treaty in the Financial Regulation, 
which it considers useful.  On the other hand, the question arises of the possible 
transfer  of  certain  provisions  of  the  implementing  rules  to  the  Financial 
Regulation  and  vice  versa  and  the  Commission  proposes  that  the  Financial 
Regulation  should  contain  matters  of substance  currently  dealt  with  in  the 
implementing rules, such as  thresholds for the ACPC and the responsibilities of 
the accounting officer. 
Scope  of the  Financial  Regulation  in  relation  to  the  "own  resources" 
regulation and sectoral rules:  the  Commission suggests retaining the present 
format of the Regulation which should incorporate neither the "own resources" 
regulation  (which  deals  with  a  specific  matter)  nor  sectoral  rules  (where  the 
relationship with the Financial Regulation is clearly defined by the principle lex 
specialis//ex generalis) nor again the interinstitutional  agreements  (which must 
continue to be sources of"soft law"). 
CONCLUSION 
In this working paper the Commission wishes to  demonstrate the importance it 
attaches  to  large-scale  involvement  of the. other  institutions  and  the  Member 
States in the overhaul of  the Financial Regulation.  In view of  the general scope of 
the  Financial  Regulation,  which  applies  to  the  entire  budget  and  all  the 
institutions,  combined  with  the  ambitious  objectives  of  the  overhaul,  the 
Commission is presenting, as the first step, the broad lines of its current thinking. 
It will ensure that the provisions of the Financial Regulation are in harmony with 
the current programmes for the reform of financial management (MAP 2000 and 
Agenda 2000). 
Commission Regulation (Euratom, ECSC, EC) No 3418/93 of 9 December 1993 laying down detailed 
rules for  the  implementation of certain provisions of the Financial Regulation of 21  December 1977 
(OJL315, 16.12.1993,p.l.). 
13  . IL  PROBLEMS OF SUBSTANCE 
14 NOTE 
The proposal for a general recasting of  the Financial Regulation will have to take account 
of the  amendment of instmments to  which the current Financial Regulation refers,  for 
instance to  the joint declaration of 30 June 1982  as  regards  legal  bases (Article 22(1 )). 
Account will have to be taken in this connection of the judgment of the Court of Justice 
of 12 May 1998 in Case C-1 06/96 and of a possible interinstitutional agreement on the 
matter of  legal bases. 
Similarly  Title VIII  on  the  EAGGF  refers  in  a  number  of provisions  to  Regulation 
No 729/70 which is in the process of  being amended in such a way which will inevitably 
entail  amendments  to  the  provisions  of  the  Financial  Regulation.  For  instance 
Article 104  Fin. Reg.  on  the  procedure  for  the  transfer  of  EAGGF-Guarantee 
appropriations is  based on the assumption that these appropriations are for compulsory 
expenditure;  this  will  no  longer  be  the  case  in  future  for  "rural  development" 
appropriations, which arc non-compulsory.  Allowance will have to be made for the fact 
that compulsory and non-compulsory expenditure exist side-by-side by harmonising the 
time-limits within which the budgetary authority must take  decisions on proposals  for 
transfers of appropriations (e.g.  four months regardless of whether it is  the Council or 
Parliament which has the last word). 
It should also be borne in mind that the general overhaul proposal will be separate from 
the  proposals  for  amendment  currently  being  considered  (seventh  series- proposal 
COM(96) 351  final  and  amended  proposal  COM(97) 542  final- and  eighth  series -
proposal COM(1998) 206 presented on 3 April 1998). 
15 TOPIC ONE 
STATEMENT OF THE PRINCIPLES OF BUDGETARY LA \V 
A.  General comment 
The  study  of budgetary  law  traditionally  distinguishes  five  major  principles  (unity, 
universality, specification, annuality and sound financial management) which any system 
should  comply  with  for  reasons  of  openness,  democratic  control  and  optimum 
management of  resources. 
While it is true that these fundamental principles are enshrined both in the budgetary law 
of the  Member  State  and  in  the  system  applicable  to  the  general  budget  of the 
Communities, they are nonetheless subject, to  differing degrees, to  exceptions similarly 
enshrined in legislative instruments and justified by management requirements. 
The Commission believes  that the  exceptions  to  the principles of budgetary law 
cannot be eliminated entirely, but appropriate conditions must be imposed on those 
which are retained. 
In its opinion 4/97, the Court recommends that the Financial Regulation impose a strict 
interpretation of  the fundamental principles ofbudgetary law.  In the Commission's view, 
if  this suggestion were to be applied literally, it would take away much of the flexibility 
required  to  implement  a  budget  which  is  becoming  increasingly  complicated,  in 
particular because of the  diversity of the  operations  financed  and  the  quality  criteria 
which have to  be applied to  their financing.  The Commission believes that it wquld be 
better to look for greater transparency in the exceptions to the principles rather than to 
apply them with utmost stringency.  In this the Commission will  ensure that only the 
exceptions to the fundamental principles which can be justified by objective requirements 
are retained and it will eliminate exceptions which, because they are not justified, could 
be a source of  misuse. 
The principle of unity is  set out in the first paragraph of Article 199  of the Treaty as 
follows: "all items of revenue and expenditure of the Community ...  shall be included in 
estimates to be drawn up for each financial year and shall be shown in the budget". 
The  Court  finds  that  this  principle  is  not  properly  applied  and  criticises  it  in  its 
opinion 4/97 on three counts:  (a) proliferation of Funds (Guarantee Fund  for  external 
operations,  European  Investment  Fund  and  European  Guarantee  Fund  to  encourage 
cinema and television productions, in the process of being established),  (b) treatment of 
borrowing and  lending  operations  outside  the  budget  and  (c) the  concept  of negative 
expenditure. 
16 (a)  The Funds 
The issue 
This  concerns certain  Funds,  financed  in  whole  (Guarantee  Fund  for  External 
Actions) or in part (European Investment Fund or Fund to encourage cinema and 
television productions) from  the  Community budget.  Once set up  these Funds 
involve revenue and expenditure of their own which arc not shown in the revenue 
and expenditure account. 
The  Court  sees  these  financial  mechanisms  as  paving  the  way  for  increasing 
fragmentation of  Community finances and a loss of  financial transparency. 
However, the Court itself explains the raison d 'etre of these funds: they serve as 
working  capital  designed  to  match  budgetary  expenditure  to  final  expenditure 
which inevitably varies as  a result of erratic and unforeseeable movements.  The 
Court also admits that the principle of  unity is bound to be breached in the case of 
these Funds, which do not draw their resources exclusively from the Community 
budget.  The Court's criticism is  directed principally at  the Guarantee Fund for 
External Actions. 
The Commission believes  that  straightforward  budgctisation  of the  operations 
carried out from  these Funds is  not  an appropriate solution,  given the function 
underlined above of supplying working capital.  The Commission would favour 
rather ensuring maximum transparency of  operations carried out from the Funds. 
In  this  connection  it  would  point  out  that  financial  movements  and  the 
end-of-year situation of the Guarantee Fund for External Actions already appear 
in the revenue and expenditure account and the balance sheet.  The issue of the 
Court's  right  to  audit  Funds  in  which  the  Commission  is  involved  as  a 
shareholder is a separate matter not connected with the principle of unity.  For the 
funds,  where the  Community simply  contributes  part of the  capital  (ElF),  the 
Commission will ensure that the Court is allowed to conduct a proper audit of the 
sound utilisation of the Community contribution and will send the Court all the 
documents it receives as a shareholder. 
The Commission would also  reiterate its call to  sec the European Development 
Fund entered in the budget. 
(b)  Borrowing and lending 
The issue 
The Court criticises the  fact  that borrowing and  lending operations give rise to 
revenue which is not recorded as such in the general budget. 
Suggestion 
If the institutions arc still unable to  come to  an agreement on the entry of these 
operations in the budget, the Commission would point out that Annex II to Part B 
17 of the  budget  provides  detailed  information  about  the  borrowing  and  lending 
operations guaranteed by the general budget in accordance with Article 20 of the 
Financial  Regulation.  It  would  add  that  the  results  of borrowing/lending 
operations arc included in the revenue and expenditure account and the balance 
sheet (Article 135 ofthe Financial Regulation). 
The Commission would therefore propose seeking ways of achieving  a clearer 
presentation within the existing rules. 
(c)  Negative expenditure. revenue and reserves 
3 
The issue 
The Court  observes  that  a  number of negative  amounts  appear in  the budget: 
negative  expenditure,  which  is  actually  revenue, ·negative  revenue,  which  the 
Court claims is actually expenditure, and finally negative reserves, which are not 
used by commitments and payments but offset and cancelled out by transfers of 
positive, unused appropriations.  According to the Court, every negative amount 
introduces  a  lack  of transparency  and  makes  reading  and  understanding  the 
budget more difficult. 
The Commission agrees that the concept of  negative expenditure, the target of  the 
Court's criticism, is contradictory in that it is actually revenue and simply causes 
confusion for those reading and implementing the budget.  What is more, given 
the amounts of  such negative expenditure (which can derive from the decisions on 
the clearance of the EAGGF accounts and  from  the  supplementary levy),  their 
inclusion in the budget undermines the agricultural guideline, which is defined as 
the ceiling on agricultural expenditure. 
The Commission is prepared to look into the possibility of eliminating negative 
expenditure.  It must  be pointed  out  that  the  new  SINCOM 2  system  cannot 
operate with negative amounts and practical solutions have therefore had to  be 
found to enter these amounts in the accounts. 
Negative  expenditure  derives  from  a  highly  complex .budgetary  mechanism. 
There are four separate categories of  negative expenditure: 
amounts recovered in  cases of fraud  and irregularities.  These amounts 
arc  booked  to  a  number of budget  items  (with  the  heading  "Other") 
carrying  a  p.m.  For this  category  the  Commission  suggests  applying 
arrangements  similar to  rc-use.J  The  new  SINCOM 2  system  should 
make it possible to usc such amounts almost immediately; 
"profits" which may be made on sales from public storage.  They derive 
essentially  from  two  factors:  (a)  depreciation  in  earlier  years  which 
exceeds  the  actual  selling  price,  and  (b) entry  in  the  accounts  at  the 
Article 27(2)(a) allows revenue arising from the refund of  amounts paid in error to be re-used  . 
. 18 intervention price of quantities supplied as aid to the needy.  Although in 
this  second  category  it  is  debatable  whether  the  amount  actually  is 
revenue, the Commission would suggest applying arrangements similar 
to re-use, given the link between the amount and the expenditure borne in 
earlier years by the depreciation items; 
the supplementary levy on milk.  This is genuine revenue; however, the 
link  with  the  expenditure  that  overproduction of milk  would  entail  is 
fairly obvious.  It should therefore also be treated as earmarked revenue; 
the  financial  consequences  of decisions  on  the  clearance  of accounts. 
The amounts involved are revenue about which the Commission has an 
open mind.  One view is  that they should be treated  as  miscellaneous 
revenue, since they are recovered several years after they were disbursed. 
Or it can be argued that it is easy to  identify the budget items to  which 
the  initial  expenditure  was  charged  and  so  they  could  be  treated  as 
earmarked revenue. 
In  all  these  cases,  provision  must  be  made  for  the  amount  re-used  or  the 
earmarked revenue to be offset against the monthly advances paid to the Member 
States. 
If the  above  approach  were  to  be  adopted,  Regulations 729/70  (clearance  of 
accounts),  and  856/84  and  3950/92  (supplementary  levy)  and  most  of the 
regulations establishing market organisations as regards the other public storage 
costs would also have to be amended accordingly. 
At all  events, it would be possible to  make provision in  the specific title of the 
Financial Regulation dealing with the EAGGF Guarantee Section for adjustments 
to  the general rules applicable to  earmarked revenue or re-use to  allow for  the 
specific requirements in this area. 
Negative  revenue  is  made  up  of the  administrative  costs  (1 0%)  deducted  by 
Member States for the collection of  own resources.  The Commission agrees that 
the term "negative revenue" is rather unfortunate but believes that these amounts 
cannot be treated in the same way as Community expenditure, as they constitute a 
reduction in revenue which is deducted at source by Member States and shown in 
the budget for information purposes. 
Negative revenue must therefore be retained for reasons of transparency and the 
Commission believes that this is an appropriate way of showing these amounts in 
the budget. 
As regards the negative reserve, the Commission agrees that this instrument is not 
above criticism from -the  point of view of correct budget procedure but would 
point  out  that  it  was  introduced  by  the  budgetary  authority  as  a  means  of 
negotiation between the two arms to bring about the conclusion of the procedure. 
What is  more, it is  in actual fact  an advance estimate of appropriations that will 
not be used during the year and will therefore lapse. 
19 (d)  Expenditure on  common foreign  and security policy and cooperation in  the 
field of justice and home affairs 
Acting  unanimously,  the  Council  can  (Articles J.ll  and  K.8)  decide  that 
operational expenditure on the common foreign and security policy (CFSP) and 
cooperation in the field of  justice and home affairs (JHA) should be charged to 
the Community budget.  When the Amsterdam Treaty enters into force it will be 
the  mle  for  such  expenditure  to  be  financed  by  the  Community  budget 
(Articles J.18 and K.13). 
Despite the  special  distribution of the  roles  of the  institutions provided  for  in 
Titles V  and  VI  of the  Treaty  on  European  Union,  the  Financial  Regulation 
applies to  implementation of CFSP or JHA expenditure.  When CFSP and JHA 
operational  expenditure  is  charged  to  the  budget,  it  has  to  be  the  Financial 
Regulation  which  governs  implementation.  It  must  be  stressed  that  the 
appropriations for these two areas are entered in the Commission's section of the 
budget  and  that  neither  the  Treaty  nor  the  Interinstitutional  Agreement  on 
financing the CFSP calls into question the powers conferred on the Commission 
by Article 205 of  the Treaty to implement the budget. 
The Commission would suggest, however, to make matters entirely clear, that it 
·be expressly  stated  that  the  Financial  Regulation  applies  to  such  expenditure. 
This would involve expanding the second indent of the second subparagraph of 
Article 1(2) to state that the revenue and expenditure ofthe Communities includes 
operational  expenditure  under  the  common  foreign  and  security  policy  and 
cooperation in the  field  of justice  and  home  affairs  when  this  expenditure  is 
charged to the general budget of  the European Communities. 
C.  Universality 
The issue 
The principle of universality  provides  that  all  revenue  is  used  without  distinction  to 
finance all expenditure.  This means that all revenue and expenditure must be entered in 
full in the budget without any adjustment against each other, and that no revenue should 
be intended to cover specific expenditure. 
The mle of not earmarking expenditure for  specific purposes was not enshrined in the 
Treaty  and  it  is  the  Financial  Regulation  which  lays  down  both  the  mles  and  the 
exceptions  to  them.  Article4(2)  states  this  principle  ("total  revenue  shall  cover total 
expenditure")  but  also  provides  that  certain  revenue  should  be  used  for  a  specific 
purpose, giving a non-exhaustive ("notably") list of  earmarked revenue. 
The  possibility of re-using  certain  categories  of revenue  (Article 27(2))  is  a  second 
exception to the principle of universality.  In this case the list of revenue available for 
re-use is exhaustive (points (a) to (h)). 
20 The Court did not criticise these two  exceptions  to  the principle of universality.  The 
Commission believes that these exceptions are justified on the grounds of the link which 
exists between certain items of  revenue and certain items of  expenditure. 
The  Commission  can  sec  no  reason  for  amending  the  provisions  of the  Financial 
Regulation  concerning  application  of the  principle  of universality.  The  Commission 
would suggest updating the list of earmarked revenue in Article 4 to  include interest on 
blocked  accounts  and  exchange  gains.  It would  also  suggest  that  the  repayment  of 
payments on account (Article 7(7) Fin. Reg.) and the restoration of lapsed appropriations 
(Article 7{6) Fin. Reg.) should be covered by the same legal arrangements as re-use (see 
E below). 
D.  Specification 
The issue 
The concept of specification relates to the specific purpose for which each appropriation 
is authorised.  This principle demands that the budgetary authority should give detailed 
explanations of  the purposes for which appropriations are authorised, thus establishing a 
regulatory framework in the shape of a budget nomenclature which the Commission, in 
implementing the budget, is bound to abide by.  The purpose of  specification is to avoid 
any  confusion - in  both  authorisation  and  implementation - between  different 
appropriations. 
The Court argues  that  the  exception  to  the  principle of specification comes  from  the 
possibility of transferring appropriations: estimates and authorisations do not always 
correspond  to  the  real  needs  which  emerge  at  the  implementation  stage,  and  the 
possibility is provided of transferring appropriations from one item to another, by taking 
appropriations from the items where they are no longer required and transferring them to 
items where there is a greater need. 
The principle of specification and transfers of appropriations are expressly enshrined in 
the Treaty and the Financial Regulation. 
The  principle  is  laid  down  ·in  the  third  paragraph  of Article 202  of the  Treaty 
("appropriations  shall  be  classified  under  different  chapters  grouping  items  of 
expenditure  according  to  their  nature  or  purpose  and  subdivided,  as  far  as  may  be 
necessary,  in accordance  with  the  regulations  made pursuant  to  Article 209")  and  by 
Article 19(2) ofthe Financial Regulation. 
The exception (transfers of appropriations) is  expressly enshrined in the third paragraph 
of Article 205 of  the EC Treaty ("within the budget, the Commission may, subject to the 
limits and conditions laid down in the regulations made pursuant to Article 209, transfer 
appropriations from one chapter to  another or from one subdivision to  another") and by 
Articles 26, 95 and 104 Fin. Reg. 
21 The Court maintains that compliance with the principle of specification is  inadequate. 
The first  reason for  this  is  that the budget remarks are  too vague about the conditions 
governing  the  usc  of appropriations,  with  the  result  that  the  Commission can choose 
which item to  charge expenditure to  depending on availability of appropriations.  The 
second reason given by the Court is  that the nomenclature is  not uniformly detailed as 
regards  the breakdown of appropriations  into
1.titles,  chapters,  articles  and  items  with 
specific  arrangements  for  research  appropriations  where  the  scale of the  subdivisions 
affected  by  transfers  of research  appropriations  is  out  of line  with  that  generally 
applicable (see Article 95). 
Items carrying very small amounts exist alongside others carrying several billion ecus 
which, claims the Court, are quite simply budgets within the budget. 
Finally the  Court argues that transfer arrangements which  are  too  broad,  by allowing 
transfers  which  are  not  authorised  by  the  budgetary  authority,  can  undermine 
transparency by reducing the normative value of the budget as it was voted, in particular 
for operating appropriations.  For administrative appropriations, on the other hand,  the 
Court envisages giving institutions greater freedom to determine the optimal allocation of 
the resources at thCir disposal and suggests that all the institutions should be subject to 
the same arrangements for transfers. 
The  Commission  believes  that  strict  and  absolute  application  of the  principle  of 
specification would be neither possible nor desirable.  As  was seen above,  the  Treaty 
itself provides  for  the  possibility  of transfers  of appropriations  (third  paragraph  of 
Article 205).  The  budgetary  law  of a  number of countries4  provides,  with  various 
degrees  of strictness  in  application,  both  for  the  principle  of specification  and  for 
transfers of  appropriations. 
As regards the budget nomenclature, the Commission agrees with the Court that the list 
of subdivisions (titles, chapters, articles and items) must be harmonised.  Determination 
of the degree of detail of the nomenclature (should it  always go  down to  the  level of 
items or can it stop at articles or chapters) and the size of the allocations to each heading 
arc, however, matters for which the budgetary authority alone is competent. 
It would not seem appropriate for the Financial Regulation to impose restrictions on the 
budgetary authority's freedom  to draw up the budget nomenclature.  This reflects how 
the budgetary authority wishes to  allocate appropriations to any given operation.  It is a 
matter best dealt with in an agreement between the two arms of the budgetary authority, 
if  they should consider it necessary.  The Interinstitutional Agreement would therefore be 
the  most  suitable  instrument  for  defining  in  more  uniform  terms  the  degree  of 
specification of  titles, chapters, articles and items, as requested by the Court. 
4  F (Article 14 of the loi organique relative m1x lois de finances (ord. No 59-2, 2 January 1959); 
D (Article 15 HGrG and 20 13HO); 
UN (Reg. 4.5 Fin. Rules 3). 
22 All  the same, the Commission acknowledges that the way the institutions have applied 
Article 26  Fin.  Reg.  in  practice  has  given  rise  to  a  proliferation  of transfers  of 
appropriations which in some cases can remove all substance from the budget allocations 
decided by the budgetary authority.  In this connection the thinking which has started on 
a  possible  revision  of the  "omnibus  transfer"  (Notenboom  procedure)  is  also  an 
indication  of the  increased  concern  about  the  undermining  of the  specification 
principle caused by excessive transfers of appropriations. 
In this connection the Commission is prepared to  take up the Court's approach which is 
to  distinguish between the arrangements for  transfers of administrative appropriations -
which concern all institutions and for which the Financial Regulation allows them a free 
hand in management - and the arrangements for transfers of operating appropriations for 
which  more  detailed  monitoring  is  appropriate  so  that  the  wishes  of the  budgetary 
authority as expressed in the budget established arc not undermined by a proliferation of 
transfers. 
The Commission  believes  that the  procedures  for  administrative appropriations 
should be harmonised for  all  the institutions:  each  institution  should  be given  the 
power to take decisions on transfers between chapters within each title of its own section. 
Any other transfer (between titles) would have to be approved by the budgetary authority. 
The  requirement  laid  down  in  the  second  subparagraph  of  Article 26(2)  and 
Article 26(3)(b) that the budgetary authority be informed three weeks before a transfer is 
made could be either dropped or changed to  ex post inforn1ation:  what is  the point of 
informing an institution in advance about a transfer if  that institution is not entitled- as is 
the case at present - to block this transfer?  This approach would satisfy the Court. 
For reasons of effective management the Commission would like to  retain  its  present 
powers  concerning  operating  appropriations  (i.e.  transfers  between  articles  within 
each  chapter),  as  laid  down  in  the  third  paragraph of Article 205  of the  Treaty  and 
Article 26(3) of  the Financial Regulation. 
The  Court judges this  freedom  to  make transfers  to  be excessive.  It would  like  the 
arrangements  to  be  reviewed,  which  would  mean  that  all  transfers  between  articles 
(whether or not within the same chapter) would require the approval of the  budgetary 
authority.  The Commission cannot endorse this approach which is contrary to  the third 
paragraph of Article 205  of the Treaty.  It does,  however,  agree  that  in  all  cases  the 
grounds for requests for transfers of appropriations must be properly spelled out. 
Improvements  arc  possible  in  this  matter  in  terms  of programming,  time  limits  and 
presentation of grounds.  It should be possible, however, to  make these improvements 
within  the  Commission's  internal  organisational  rules  or,  where  appropriate,  in 
interinstitutional arrangements rather than in the Financial Regulation. 
Thought should also be given to the question of  retaining paragraph 7 of  Article 26 which 
requires that every proposal for a transfer should be submitted  for the approval of the 
financial  controller  to  certify  that  appropriations  are  available.  The  availability  of 
appropriations is now automatically guaranteed by the computerised management system 
(SINCOM) and therefore the financial controllcr'.s approval is not necessary (cf.  topic 5 
concerning those involved in implementation)  This step could therefore be dropped. 
23 As regards the question of whether or not the two special arrangements for transfers of 
appropriations - research  and  technological  development  (Article 95)  and  EAGGF 
Guarantee  (Article 104)- should  be  retained,  the  Court  is  particularly  critical  of the 
special arrangements for transfers concerning research and calls for it to be dropped.  The 
Commission  would  be  open  to  a  suggestion  of simplification  in  this  area.  It  could 
envisage abandoning the special arrangements fqr shared-cost action.  On the other hand 
it  feels  that  the  special  arrangements  for  transfers  of JRC  appropriations  should  be 
retained in view of the new competitive approach introduced by the fourth  framework 
programme,  which  requires  that  the  JRC  be  given  greater  autonomy  to  transfer 
appropriations. 
The special Article 104 arrangements for EAGGF Guarantee transfers could be retained 
since this involves subjecting Commission decisions on transfers between articles to  a 
"comitology" procedure provided for in Article 13 of  Regulation 729/70 on the financing 
of the CAP which, given that such expenditure is compulsory, guarantees control over 
these transfers equivalent to that of  Council bodies. 
These specific EAGGF Guarantee arrangements will still, of  course, have to allow for the 
new measures to be 'financed (mral development, veterinary measures, FIFG, etc.) which 
will constitute non-compulsory expenditure and will therefore be subject to approval by 
Parliament after the Council has been consulted. 
The final issue is that of  the constitution of  reserves.  What is required here is that clearer 
conditions  should be laid  down  for  resorting to  the  budget instmment constituted  by 
reserves, which is what the Commission proposed in its report on the application of the 
Interinstitutional Agreement (COM(1998) 165 final of 18 March 1998). 
The Commission would suggest inserting in Article 19 Fin. Reg. that appropriations may 
be entered in reserve only in the following two situations: 
where no legal basis exists for the operation concerned when the budget is established, 
- where it is not certain that the appropriations entered under the operational headings 
are sufficient and it may be necessary to increase them at some point in the year. 
E.  Annuality 
The annuality mle applies to  the forecasting  and  implementation aspects of the budget 
exercise and means that budget appropriations arc used within a given year.  In the case 
of  the Community the budget year is the same as the calendar year. 
If appiied strictly, this mle would result in  all  appropriations not used at  31  December 
(end of the budget year) lapsing.  However, natural management requirements would not 
allow the usc of  appropriations to be subject strictly to this annual framework; there must 
be some exceptions to  the  annuality  mle or some flexibility  in  its  application.  Such 
exceptions  are  the  additional  periods,  carryovers  of appropriations,  the  commitment 
appropriations made available again and the re-use of amounts deriving from payments 
on account which are repaid. 
24 Present mles 
The annuality principle is  enshrined in  a number of places  in  the  EC Treaty:  the  first 
paragraph of Article 199  provides  that  all  items  of revenue  and  expenditure must be 
included  in  estimates  "for each  financial  year";  Article 202  adds  that  expenditure  is 
authorised "for one financial  year";  finally  Article 203(1)  provides  that  "the financial 
year shall run from 1 January to 31  December". 
The Treaty also provides for the possibility of exceptions to  the annuality mle: to begin 
with the first paragraph of Article 202 states: the expenditure shown in the budget shall 
be  authorised  for  one  financial  year,  unless  the  regulations  made  pursuant  to 
Article 209  provide otherwise".  And  the  second  paragraph  of that  article  adds  "in 
accordance with conditions to be laid down pursuant to  Article 209, any appropriations, 
other than  those  relating  to  staff expenditure,  that  are  unexpended  at  the  end  of the 
financial year may be carried forward to the next financial year only". 
The following exceptions arc allowed by the Financial Regulation to the annuality rule: 
(1)  Additional periods 
The Financial Regulation provides for three "additional periods" which are ad hoc 
extensions of the financial year beyond the twelve months of the calendar year: 
Payments (ordinary arrangements) 
Payments must be  authorised  by no  later than  31  December by which 
date they must have reached the financial controller.  But the accounting 
officer has until  15 January of the following year to  make the payments 
(sixth paragraph of  Article 6). 
lmprest accounts 
Expenditure corresponding to  payments made up  to  31  December from 
imprests  may  be entered  in  the  accounts  for  the  previous  year up  to 
15 Fcbmary of  the following year (Article 54(2)). 
EAGGF Guarantee 
Because of the time required to transpose at Community level the figures 
supplied  by  Member  States,  an  extra  month  is  allowed  for  entering 
EAGGF Guarantee expenditure in the accounts (up to 31  January of the 
following year; Article 101). 
Apart  from  these  three  additional  periods,  an  exceptional  arrangement 
concerning revenue is  the advance payment in year 11  of own resources 
corresponding  to  January  of yearn + 1  pursuant  to  Article 1  0(2)  of 
Regulation 1552/89 (second paragraph of  Article G Fin. Reg.). 
(2)  Carryovers 
25 The  carryover  arrangements  are  laid  down  in  Article 7  of  the  Financial 
Regulation:  both  for  non-differentiated  appropriations  {paragraph 1)  and  for 
differentiated appropriations (paragraph 2), the general rule is that appropriations 
not used at the end of  the financial year lapse. 
Under  no  circumstances  may  appropriations  relating  to  remunerations  and 
allowances of members of staff of the institutions and provisional appropriations 
be carried over. 
Under the present system of appropriations, the possibilities and arrangements for 
carryovers differ according to whether the appropriations are non-differentiated 
or differentiated. 
(3)  Appropriations made available again 
Article 7(6)  of the  Financial  Regulation  provides that where  commitments  are 
cancelled,  as  a result of total  or partial non-implementation of the  projects  for 
which the appropriations were earmarked, in any financial year after that in which 
the commitment appropriations  were  entered  in  the  budget,  the  appropriations 
concerned will, as a rule, lapse, but the Commission may decide, at the start of  the 
following year,  that  the  appropriations may be made available again in certain 
circumstances. 
(4)  Repayment ofpayments on account 
Article 7(7) of the Financial Regulation provides that revenue deriving from the 
repayment of  payments on account is to be entered in suspense accounts.  At the 
start of each financial year the Commission may decide to  re-use this revenue in 
the heading from which the original expenditure was made. 
The possibility of re-using revenue deriving from the repayment of payments on 
account is an exception both to the principle of  annuality (since the appropriations 
available in yearn + I  are increased by revenue accruing  in yearn) and to  the 
principle of  universality (since this revenue is allocated to the heading from which 
the  original  expenditure  was  made,  instead of being  entered  as  miscellaneous 
revenue). 
The issue 
The Court criticises the "complex array" of carryovers, whether automatic or simply a 
possibility for the Commission, which, it claims, undermines the principle of annuality 
and should, in the main, be abolished.  The Court is particularly critical of  the possibility 
of justifying carryovers in cases  where "the appropriations provided  for  the  headings 
concerned  in  the  budget  for  the  following  year  do  not  cover  requirements" 
(Article 7(l)(a)  and  (2)(b)),  since,  if  the  budgetary  authority  has  not  provided 
appropriations with the same purpose for the following year, this clearly demonstrates its 
determination to terminate the measures in question. 
The  Commission  agrees  that  the  provisions  of the  Financial  Regulation  governing 
carryovers and the restoration of appropriations are drafted in vague terms which leave a 
great deal to the Commission's discretion.  The Financial Regulation allows carryovers in 
26 the case of  items where preliminaries have been "virtually completed" at 31  December or 
where the Council has adopted  a basic instrument "towards the end of  the year" or when 
the  appropriations  provided  in  the  budget  for  the  following  year  "do  not  cover 
requirements".  The  Financial  Regulation  also  uses  other  expressions  such  as 
"compelling needs", "as a rule", the Commission "assesses in the light of requirements" 
when it is "essential to carry out the programme originally planned", etc. 
Suggestion 
It  is  the  Commission's  view  that  carryovers  cannot  be  ruled  out  altogether  since 
provision  is  made  for  them  in  the  second  paragraph  of Article 202  of the  Treaty. 
Similarly,  the  "additional  periods"  discussed  above  arc  a  technical  arrangement  for 
applying the principle of  annuality and there can be no questioning their legality. 
The Commission therefore proposes that the Commission should retain competence for 
adopting decisions on carryovers (differentiated appropriations), and appropriations to be 
made available again  and  re-used,  but that the texts  be re-drafted to  eliminate all 
ambiguity concerning the circumstances in  which  appropriations can  be carried 
over, made availablp again or re-used: clearer definitions should be given of what is 
meant by "operations for which preliminaries have been virtually completed", or when · 
the adoption of the legal basis by the Council can be considered "late", what exactly is 
meant by "repayment of advances by recipients of  Community aid", what arc "projects", 
"programmes", "operations", etc.s  The substantive conditions for using these techniques 
need to be defined more strictly, in particular Article 7(6) (appropriations made available 
again) which in future will be very important for the Structural Funds if the re-entry in 
the budget is no longer allowed as proposed by the Commission in Agenda 2000. 
The  Commission  proposes  that  decisions  on  all  carryovers  of  administrative 
appropriations should be taken by the budgetary authority.  However, it would be a good 
idea  to  introduce  rather  more  flexible  arrangements  for  carryovers  of administrative 
appropriations.  Without this  flexibility,  the  tendency is  at  all  costs to  spend residual 
amounts  at  the  end  of the  year  (which  have  often  not  been  committed  because  of 
end-of-year procedural logjams), a practice hardly consistent with sound management of 
resources. 
It is also unclear whether there is  any point in maintaining the special arrangements for 
non-automatic  carryovers  of  non-differentiated  appropriations  committed  after 
15 December for  equipment,  supplies  and works,  for  which the  only argument would 
appear  to  be  that  it  is  tradition.  The  difficulty  in  carrying  over  appropriations  for 
purchases  of equipment,  work  and  supplies  committed  after  15 December  places 
authorising officers before the choice of spending at all costs or seeing the appropriations 
lapse.  If these appropriations could be carried over like all others, authorising officers 
would  be  able  to  use  them  in  a  manner  more  consistent  with  sound  financial 
management. 
As regards the re-use of revenue deriving from the repayment of payments on account 
(Article 7(7)), this could be regarded as the same as re-use.  As was seen above this is 
5  On this point see part 3 Problems of  form. 
27 an exception to  the nile of universality rather than the rule of annuality.  In actual fact, 
revenue deriving from the repayment of payments on account is dealt with in very much 
the  same way as  revenue  deriving  from  the  refund of amounts paid  in error against 
budget appropriations (Article 27(2)(a)). 
The difference between these two cases is very slight,  consisting solely of  the fact that in 
the case of  repayment of  payments on account, the original payment was perfectly licit at 
the outset and it is only because the beneficiary fails to use the sums properly that they 
are claimed back, whereas in the case provided for in Article 27(2)(a), the payment was 
wrong at the outset. 
This purely notional difference is no reason why the legal arrangements should not be the 
same.  The Commission would accordingly suggest that Article 7(7) be deleted and that 
revenue  deriving  from  the  repayment  of payments  on  account  be  included  under 
Article 27(2)(a) (revenue available for re-use). 
This same treatment (re-use) could also be applied to  appropriations made available 
again  when  commitments  arc  cancelled  (Article 7(6))  which  would  mean  that  the 
appropriations concerned do not have to be blocked until the start of the following year. 
This  would  ensure  harmonised  treatment  of what  are  essentially  much  the  same 
circumstances. 
F.  Disclosure, oncnness and sound financial management 
(a)  Disclosure and openness 
The issue 
In  its  opinion 4/97  the  Court  maintains  that  the  principle of disclosure  is  not 
respected in the accounts as  published, which do not show the same detail as the 
budget.  It also  criticises,  from  the  angle  of openness,  the  JRC's  accounting 
system that is outside the budget. 
SJ!r.gestion 
The Commission would suggest enhancing openness in the establishment of the 
budget, its implementation and in publication of  the accounts. 
At the  establishment  stage  the  Commission would  suggest  restoring  the  strict 
one-month deadline for publication of  the budget by deleting the term "normally" 
in Article 10. 
At the implementation stage it is planned to tighten the requirements concerning 
grounds  for  transfers  and  carryovers  and  to  overhaul  the  omnibus  transfer 
(Notenboom) procedure (seeD above). 
Reference should also be made to the amendments that the Commission suggests 
for  enhancing  openness  in  the  management  of funds  and  borrowing/lending 
operations (see B above). 
28 The question of the publication of  accounts will be considered under Topic Three 
(accounting principles). 
The  special  JRC  accounting  system  will  disappear  with  the  introduction  of 
SIN  COM 2 on 1 October 1998. 
(b)  Sound financial management 
The issue 
The Commission takes the view that this principle must be reinforced by defining 
it  clearly  and  by attaching  greater  importance  to  the  financial  statement  and 
evaluation, the instruments for applying this principle. 
The  Court  made  no  comments  about  sound  financial  management  m  its 
opinion 4/97. 
Suggestion 
The Commission would first  suggest defining  the  principle of sound financial 
management  in  Article 2  of the  Financial  Regulation  by  reference  to  the 
principles of economy, efficiency and effectiveness and specifying in the same 
article that the results of periodic reviews of operations must be made available 
before  any  decision  to  extend  or  amend  an  operation  and  must  accompany 
proposals for decisions to extend or amend an operation. 
To  show that  the  resources  to  be mobilised  match  the  objective  pursued,  the 
content  of the  financial  statement  should  be  extended  to  cover  details  of 
requirements in appropriations and staff (Article 3(2) Fin. Reg.). 
Finally, the Commission would suggest that a reference to  the need for regular 
evaluation be included in the Financial Regulation. 
29 TOPIC TWO 
THE SYSTEM OF APPROPRIATIONS AND THE CONCEPT OF 
COMMITMENT 
A.  Aimropriations 
1.  Administrative appropriations :md operating appropriations 
The issue 
The  March 1990  rcvtston  of the  Financial  Regulation  enshrined  (Article 19(1))  the 
distinction, within the Commission section of the budget, between a Part A for the staff 
and administrative expenditure of the institution and a Part B for operating expenditure. 
This distinction between Parts A and B is a classification according to purpose and had in 
fact  existed  since  1981  under the  third  paragraph of Article 202  of the  Treaty which 
allows expenditure ~o be classified according to nature or purpose. 
In  opinion 4/97  the  Court  is  critical,  on  the  grounds  of specification,  of the  use  of 
operating  appropriations  for  administrative  expenditure  which  ought  to  come  under 
Part A  of the  Commission  section of the  budget.  It recommends  that  either  a  clear 
distinction be made between Parts A  and B, ruling out any charging of administrative 
expenditure to  Part B  appropriations,  or taking the view that  all  resources  must  serve 
clearly stated purposes  and,  in  that  case,  all  appropriations  must  be  considered  to  be 
operating  appropriations.  It  also  stresses  the  transparency  in  the  charging  of 
administrative expenditure to operational items, a subject which it recently discussed in 
its sectoral letter of 25 March 1998  on the administrative expenditure of the Phare and 
Tacis programmes.  · 
The  Commission  does  not  agree  with  the  Court's  view  that  charging  administrative 
expenditure to Part B is in breach of the specification principle.  Both the Treaty (third 
paragraph  of Article 202)  and  the  Financial  Regulation  (Article 19(2))  require  that 
expenditure be classified according to nature or purpose.  The administrative expenditure 
charged to Part B can therefore be considered to be expenditure classified according to 
purpose (and not nature), which satisfies the requirements of  the Treaty and the Financial 
Regulation. 
The  Commission  docs,  however,  agree  that  the  situation  to  which  the  Court  draws 
attention is anomalous as  regards the presentation of appropriations and the distinction 
between Part A and Part B required by Article 19 of  the Financial Regulation. 
There are many reasons why this has come about.  First of  all, even though the distinction 
between Part A and Part B existed de facto since the  1981  budget, it was not  formally 
recognised  until  the  amendment of the  Financial  Regulation  in  1990,  and  hence  the 
legality of administrative appropriations included in appropriations for operations, could 
not be questioned.  What is more, authorising officers have been facing difficulties as a 
result  of the  need  to  finance  new  operations  without  the  necessary  administrative 
30 appropriations being available.  Finally, the budgetary authority has been responsible for 
the increase in  the  number of headings involving administrative appropriations within 
Part B through the remarks to the budget items. 
In the new situation created by Article 19 Fin. Reg., the budgetary authority was obliged 
to  tidy up the  presentation of the  Commission's section of the  budget.  In the  1991 
budget,  most of the Part B  items carrying  administrative appropriations were grouped 
together in Title A4 and Subsection B8.  Subsequent1y Subsection B8 was re-integrated 
in Part A. 
However, the budgetary authority did not include administrative expenditure relating to 
research  in  this  exercise,  because  of the  specific  provisions  concerning  research  in 
Title VII of the Financial Regulation; likewise the mini-budgets for the Structural Funds 
were also  excluded, as  the budgetary authority  felt  that the  discipline imposed by the 
remarks  to  the  budget  headings  concerned  and  by the  specific  Fund  regulations  was 
sufficient. 
Apart  from  these  two  cases  other  administrative  appropriations  could  be  charged  to 
operating  items  via  remarks  allowing  the  heading  to  cover  certain  administrative 
expenditure  (studies,  experts,  conferences)  "directly linked  to  the  achievement of the 
objective  of the  action  of which  they  form  an  integral  part,  excluding  expenditure 
concerning the management of  these actions or general administration". 
In  1997  the  Commission's  Inspectorate-General  (IGS)  inspected  the  usc  made  of 
technical assistance bureaus.  The IGS report revealed that because the appropriations in 
Part A were inadequate, in particular as  a result of the conversion of appropriations to 
posts,  it  was not possible to  charge to  Part A  all  administrative expenditure linked  to 
programmes.  In  its  recommendations  the  IGS  proposes  that  tasks  entrusted  to  such 
bureaus to  assist the Commission in implementing Community programmes or policies 
should be considered accessories to  these programmes/policies.  The costs  involved in 
paying for the services of these bureaus should therefore be charged in full to the budget 
heading for the programme/policy in Part B.  The IGS argued that in addition to charging 
such expenditure to Part B the Commission should give an  undertaking to be fully open 
about such expenditure and  to  provide the  budgetary authority with a regular detailed 
report about these activities and their impact in terms of  financial and human resources. 
Three solutions could be envisaged. 
The  first  (clear  and  absolute  distinction  between  Parts A  and  B  and  hence  total 
elimination of mini-budgets)  is,  on the  face  of it,  relatively simple:  all  administrative 
appropriations (personnel costs, nmning costs, studies, consultants, technical assistance 
bureaus) existing in Part B would first have to be identified and then entered in  Part A, 
allocated to the same policy if necessary (research - which would mean revising Title VII 
of the Financial Regulation- Structural Funds, external aid, etc.).  But if the system is to 
work and  the situations  encountered  in  the past  are  not  to  arise  again,  a  completely 
unambiguous  definition  of "administrative  appropriations"  must  first  be  found.  In 
addition, there would have to be a guarantee that these appropriations, located entirely in 
Part A, were adequate, in order to remove any temptation to usc operating appropriations 
to cover administrative expenditure.  In particular this would mean revising the ceiling 
for heading 5 of the financial  perspective.  It would also  require closer scrutiny of the 
booking of  expenditure when the budget is implemented. 
31 A  second  solution  would  be  to  drop  the  distinction  between  Part A  and  Part B 
(amendment  of Article 19(1)  of the  Financial  Regulation)  and  allocate  all  available 
appropriations  to  individual  policies.  This  would  be  an  interesting  solution  if the 
Commission were to  decide to present an entirely activity-based budget.  The first step 
would have to  be  a  study of the feasibility  and benefits of such an option,  and a clear 
definition of all the human and other administrative resources required to  undertake the 
Commission's activities. 
• The  Commission  suggested  a  third  approach  in  its  draft  reviSion  of the  mles  for 
implementing  the  Financial  Regulation,6  which  involves  accepting  that  some 
administrative expenditure can appear in  Part B,  but  laying  down clear conditions  for 
using these appropriations and enhancing openness in management. 
In  line  with  the  principles  of  integrated  resources  management  (SEM 2000)  the 
Commission will give further  consideration to  a proposal  for  structural  reform of the 
budget  and  in  particular the  possible  introduction  of activity-based  budgeting.  This 
would  involve  assigning  to  each  activity  the  operating  appropriations  and  the 
administrative resources required for that activity.  This would amount  to applying to all 
areas  what already  exists,  to  some  extent,  in  the  area  of research  with  its  allocation 
accounts. 
The Commission's view is that it could only embark on this course if the budgetary rules 
could  be  based  on  an  integrated  presentation  of the  allocation  of  financial  and 
administrative  resources  (act}vity-based  budgeting).  This  is  a  sine  qua  non  for 
envisaging  the  merger  of  Parts A  and  B  of  the  budget  nomenclature  and  the 
corresponding  solutions  would  have  to  be  written  into  the  Financial  Regulation.  A 
residual Part A would still have to be kept for non-operational services. 
The Commission is continuing to consider the possibility of an integrated presentation of 
the budget to be adopted,in the longer term as explained above. 
For the  immediate  future,  the  Commission  would  suggest  adopting  the  intermediate 
solution  based  on  retention  of Parts A  and  B  with  conditions  being  attached  to  the 
possibilities of  charging support expenditure to Part B appropriations. 
Authorisation to book administrative expenditure to operating appropriations would have 
to be subject to the following criteria: 
6 
the basic regulations governing the operation in question should allow administrative 
and technical support expenditure to be booked to  operating appropriations as  is the 
case  for  research  and  Structural  Funds  mini-budgets.  In  this  way  the  budgetary 
authority and the legislative authority would be fully aware that this possibility exists 
and they would have approved it.  A standardised presentation of the basic instrument 
(e.g. annex to the decision) could be envisaged; 
SEC(96) 1356 final of 5 September 1996.  Article Sa of the draft revised implementing rules reads "no 
administrative  expenditure may be  charged  to  Part B,  with the  exception of expenditure  which  is 
incidental to  the operational measure and which is  authorised, by way of exception, in  the remarks 
accompanying the heading concerned". 
32 - the  possibility  of booking  administrative  and  technical  support  expenditure  to 
operating  appropriations  must  be  guided  by  the  principle  of  sound  financial 
management; 
- a ceiling (a percentage or an absolute amount) should be set in the financial allocation 
for the operation to restrict the administrative and technical support expenditure that 
can be booked to operating appropriations; 
- the administrative tasks financed from operating appropriations should not involve the. 
exercise,  by non-regular  staff,  of any authority  belonging  to  the  European  public 
service (see Topic Four below). 
Given the importance ofthese criteria, they ought to appear in the Financial Regulation.7 
2.  Differentiated and non-differentiated appropriatioJls 
The issue 
The  Community  budget  originally  contained  non-differentiated  appropriations,  i.e. 
appropriations for which amounts had to be committed and paid in the course of  the same 
year.  Appropriations  of this  type  arc  still  used  for  the  institutions'  administrative 
expenditure. 
With  the  introduction  of multiannual  operations  (external  aid,  research,  Structural 
Funds),  the  operating  appropriations  have  gradually  been  differentiated  with  the 
. commitment appropriation recording the full  amount of expenditure foreseeable over a 
number of years while the payment appropriation covers actual expenditure in each year 
concerned and thus complies with the principle of annuality.  As explained below, since 
1990, for the sake of simplicity and openness, all operating appropriations except those 
for agriculture (Title B 1 of the budget) have been differentiated.  The advantage of  this is 
that  a  single  system  is  used  for  planning,  recording  and  monitoring  operating 
expenditure. 
The Court finds  inconsistencies in the system of appropriations and in particular cases 
where  non-differentiated  appropriations  are  used  as  differentiated  appropriations,  for 
instance to  finance the construction of a building.  It  recommends a uniform system of 
appropriations which should all be ofthe differentiated type. 
The Commission agrees wholeheartedly with the Court in this matter and would point out 
that  changes  in  the  type  of appropriations  (differentiated  or non-differentiated)  is  an 
accurate reflection of the desire to take into account the reality of the obligations covered 
by the budget when these obligations extend over a number ofyrars. 
It  is  an  interesting  exercise  to  trace  the  four  stages  in  the  development of European 
budgetary law to accommodate the financing ofmultiannual operations. 
7  This approach will require amendment of Article 5a of the draft revision of the  implementing mles 
mentioned in the previous footnote. 
33 Stage 1: The Euratom Treaty 
Two approaches were used, one after the other: 
- First approach (Euratom) 1961-71 
This approach is defined in two provisions: 
Article 176 of  the Euratom Treaty 
Without giving a real definition, this provision equates commitment appropriations with 
a series of  items constituting a separate unit and forming a "coherent whole"; 
Article 4 of  the 1961  Financial Regulation for research appropriations 
This Article expands on the above Treaty provision and sets up the system employed by 
Euratom from 1961  to 1971.  This system is based on four concepts: 
•  the programme decision, broken down by objectives, 
•  the "series of  items" constituting a separate unit and forming a coherent whole, 
•  the "annual proportion" of the commitment appropriation, constituting the upper limit 
that the Community is authorised to commit each year, 
•  the payment appropriation. 
- Second approach (Euratom) 1971-7  6 
This second approach is based on Article 3 of  the 1971 Financial Regulation for research 
appropriations and Article 95 of  the 1973 General Financial Regulation. 
This second approach made two  fundamental changes in the definition of commitment 
appropriation used in this area: 
•  the first change was to  alter the concept of "series of items": this was replaced by a 
"multiannual  global  allocation"  corresponding  to  the  total  of each  allocation  by 
programme  obj~ctive.  The  purpose  of this  change  was  to  enter in  the  budget 
immediately the total allocation planned by the programme for each objective; 
•  the second change was to  equate "commitment appropriation" and "full coverage for 
the legal obligations that the Community can incur". 
This  second  change  produced  a  logical  approach  (full  coverage  of the  cost  of the 
multiannual operation) to  the commitment appropriation, as  this definition, in principle, 
mled out any division into "annual proportions" (a feature of  the first approach). 
Stage 2: Gradual introduction of"diffcrentiation" in the EEC hudgct 
This was a gradual process.  It came about in three transitional stages in certain specific 
areas: 
34 EAGGF  Guidance  (=  use  of  non-differentiated  appropriations.  hut  carried  over 
"automatically" for five years) 
For the EAGGF Guidance Section non-differentiated appropriations were used to cover 
multiannual commitments.  The total amount was committed and, as payments were then 
made over a period extending over a number of years, the appropriations corresponding 
to the commitments entered into but still outstanding were "carried over automatically" 
for up to five years.  After five years, "non-automatic carryovers" had to be used.  \Vhat 
this amounted to in practice was a system of  "camouflaged" differentiated appropriations, 
but with the drawback of the carryover arrangements.  It was not the best solution as 
appropriations and resources were mobilised before they were really needed. 
Social Fund (= first step towards introducing the concept of  commitment appropriation in 
the EEC budget: 1973) 
The  first  timid  attempt,  in  formal  terms,  to  introduce  the  concept  of commitment 
appropriation came with Articles 104 and  105 of the  1973  Financial Regulation which 
referred to "authorisation of  commitments" for the Social Fund. 
No definition of authorisation is given, but the approach is time-based: the appropriation 
for year 11  was to be entered, together with authorisations of commitments for  11  + 1 and 
II+ 2. 
ERDF (=first formal hut sectoral introduction of  commitment appropriations in the EEC 
budget: 1975) 
With  the  establishment  of the  Regional  Fund  in  March 1975,  the  1973  Financial 
Regulation  was  amended  to  include  a  special  provision  setting  up  differentiated 
appropriations (commitment appropriations and payment appropriations) for the Regional 
Fund alone. 
The definition used for this purpose was rather vague, having the clarity neither of the 
first  Euratom approach (annual proportion) nor of the second Euratom approach (total 
coverage of  the legal obligations).  It is a pragmatic definition which simply specifies that 
the commitment appropriation is  the "upper limit" on expenditure that the Community 
may commit. 
Stage 3:  Generalisation of the usc in the budget of differentiated ap_nronriations for 
nmltiannual oncrations 
The 1977 Financial Regulation reflects the awareness of the need to have differentiated 
appropriations for multiannual operations so that what is authorised in the budget - both 
for  commitments  and  for  payments- corresponds  as  accurately  as  possible  to  real 
requirements. 
The feature  of this  system  is  the  logical  approach  of the  commitment  appropriation, 
which  is  intended  to  cover  the  total  cost  of the  legal  obligations  entered  into  for 
operations  extending  over  more  than  one  financial  year  (see  third  subparagraph  of 
Article 1(4)). 
35 It is therefore a coherent restatement of the 1971  ang  1973  Euratom definition (but with 
no reference to the concept of"series of items" as this docs not apply to EEC spending as 
Euratom-type programme decisions did not exist at the time:  the situation has changed, 
however, following the Single Act and the insertion of Articles 130f to  130q in the EEC 
Treaty). 
On  the  basis  of this  provisiOn  in  the  1977  Financial  Regulation,  the  commitment 
appropriation should be used for any operation to be implemented over more than one 
year and should cover the total cost of the legal obligations entered into during the year 
for which the commitment appropriation was granted. 
In practice the Commission's guiding rule in the past for drawing up the preliminary draft 
budget was as follows: 
•  non-differentiated appropriations are used for items where the commitment is made in 
year 11  and the total payment is made in n and/or no later than 11  + I.  In this case the 
automatic carryover from 11  to n + I will cover the entire operation; 
•  differentiated  appropriations  must  be  used  for  headings  where  the  commitment  is 
made  in  n  but payment  may still  come  after  the  end  of n + I.  In this  case  the 
automatic  carryover - possible  for  one  year  only - is  no  longer  sufficient.  The 
appropriation must, therefore, be differentiated. 
The  ideal,  of course,  would  be  for  the  commitment  appropriation- and  hence  the 
commitment entered into - to cover the total cost of obligations involved in multiannual 
operations.  The reality, however, is that the system must be adjusted in its application as 
a result of  the constraints imposed by the amounts available in the budget. 
The  Commission  takes  the  view  that  the  uniform  system  of  differentiated 
appropriations provides a clearer picture of obligations covered by the Community 
budget . and  makes  possible  substantial  savings  in  resources  in  the  successive 
planning, implementation and audit stages. 
For some items of expenditure which arc not of a multiannual nature or which arc 
multiannual  in  nature  but  not  predictable  (salaries),  the  differentiation  can  be 
limited to a single year (in this case the amount for commitment is the same as the 
amount for payment each year). 
For the EAGGF Guarantee Section, where expenditure is  managed on the basis of 
non-differentiated  appropriations,  the  Commission  would  suggest  making 
appropriate  arrangements  in  the  title  of  the  Financial  Regulation  specifically 
devoted to that section (Title VIII). 
These  appropriate  arrangements would  involve  introducing  differentiation of EAGGF 
Guarantee  appropriations  but  with  commitment  appropriations  equal  to  payment 
appropriations,  commitments  made  on the  basis  of expenditure  declared  by Member 
States' paying agencies and carryovers of payment appropriations to  the following year 
automatic where they arc to cover outstanding commitments. 
B.  The con cent of commitment 
36 The issue 
Nowhere  in  the  Community's  financial  legislation  is  the  concept  of commitment 
expressly  defined.  The concept  itself covers  different  operations,  creating  confusion 
which is detrimental to sound and efficient budgetary management.  The Treaty makes no 
reference to the concept while the Financial Regulation, in Article 36, simply states that 
"in respect of any measure which may give rise to expenditure chargeable to the budget, 
the authorising officer must draw up  in advance a proposal for commitment and may not 
enter into any legally binding commitment with third parties until the financial controller 
has given approval".  Article 51  of the  Commission Regulation  laying  down  detailed 
rules for the implementation of certain provisions of the Financial Regulation, to which 
the above Article 36 refers, states that "before taking any measure which may give rise to 
expenditure, the competent authorising officer must present the financial controller with a 
commitment proposal". 
The  Court  notes  in  this  connection  that  a  commitment  has  a  legal  aspect  (legal 
commitment) and a budgetary aspect (budget or book commitment), and  each of them 
may be  either global  or specific.  The  Court  recommends  that  the  terminology used 
should be clarified and criticises the drafting of  Article 36 Fin. Reg. 
Suggestion 
As regards the definition of commitment, the Commission feels that two lessons can be 
learned from the passages of  the Financial Regulation and its implementing rules dealing 
with commitment.  First of all it is for the authorising officer to adopt the measure giving 
rise  to  expenditure  and  the  commitment  proposal.  The  Financial  Regulation  states 
implicitly, and the implementing rules explicitly, that it is the same person who proposes 
the measure giving rise to  expenditure and the commitment proposal.  The instruments 
also  show that before expenditure can be effected a basic decision must first  be taken 
(termed "measure which may give rise to  expenditure"), followed by an accounting act 
(budget or book commitment termed "proposal  for  commitment" in  Article 36(1) Fin. 
Reg.) and finally an act whereby the institution contracts a debt with the recipient (legal 
commitment). 
The conclusion is that there are three aspects to the concept of commitment: the decision 
aspect, the accounting aspect and the legal aspect. 
The Commission would therefore suggest the  following definition for  insertion in the 
Financial Regulation: 
By  commitment  is  meant  the  institution's  spending  decision,  the  recording  of this 
decision and the assumption ofthe consequences. 
It breaks  down  into  the  commitment  decision,  the  book  commitment  and  the  legal 
commitment. 
The  comn!itment  decision  consists  in  the  adoption  of the  global  or specific  financing 
decision. 
37 The book commitment consists in the accounting operations for recording the expenditure 
in the accounts and covering it by the relevant appropriation following the commitment 
decision. 
The legal commitment is the act whereby the institution enters into an obligation to third 
parties and contracts a debt. 
Sometimes the commitment decision coincides with the legal commitment: e.g.  certain 
Commission decisions already entail a legal obligation to third parties, as in the case of 
decisions  on  the  provisional  application  of  fisheries  agreements  adopted  by  the 
Commission. 
Budget implementation involves commitment, in its  above three aspects,  authorisation 
and validation of  expenditure, establishment of  claims and production of  recovery orders. 
In  this  respect,  ~hese three  aspects  of commitment  form  an  integral  part  of budget 
implementation for which the Commission is responsible under Article 205 of  the Treaty. 
The possibility of delegating the power to  adopt such acts is an entirely different matter, 
coming under the rules of procedure.  There can be no doubt that the book commitment 
and the legal commitment can be delegated.  On the other hand, it is not certain that this 
can be done for the commitment decision.  One answer could be found in the distinction 
between global commitment decisions and specific commitment decisions.  Commission 
decisions of principle determining overall financial  allocations by country,  by area of 
action or by general projects/programmes (global commitments) would have to be taken 
by the Commissioners themselves, whereas individual financing decisions, which divide 
up the overall financial allocation in accordance with criteria determined by the Council 
and/or  the  Commission  (specific  commitments)  could  be  delegated  down  to  the 
appropriate level. 
In this connection the Commission is pleased that the Court can see the usefulness of the 
distinction between global commitments and specific commitments.  The Commission 
believes  that  the  distinction  between  legal  commitments  (global  or  specific)  and 
budgetary  commitments  (global  or  specific)  must  be  enshrined  in  the  Financial 
Regulation. 
The  Commission  would  add  that  hitherto  the  global  commitments  referred  to  in 
Article 36(2) Fin.  Reg.  gave rise to  direct payments, on the basis of contracts, specific 
commitments which were never recorded in the central accounts, thereby detracting from 
the reliability and  informative value of the  accounts  and hampering the  monitoring of 
implementation.  The obligation to  be imposed by the new Article 1  (7),  which will be 
inserted under the seventh series of amendments, to  book specific commitments to  the 
initial global commitment by no later than yearn + 1 is therefore a clear step forward. 
A further rationalisation of the Article 36(2) procedure can be envisaged as  regards, for 
instance, the approval and  validation of a global  commitment relating to  a decision of 
principle which must necessarily already have been ~pproved by the financial controller. 
The Financial Regulation should provide that: 
- the institutions may not enter into legal obligations with financial implications which 
are  directly  enforceable  by  third  parties,  without  first  having  checked  that  these 
38 obligations are  lawful  and comply with  the regulations  and  the principles of sound 
financial management; 
- any legal instrument binding on the institution and generating a financial entitlement 
directly  enforceable  by third  parties  must  first  be covered by an  entry  against  the 
appropriate budget item in order to reserve the necessary funds which will release the 
institution from this legal obligation (budgetary commitment). 
A  final  aspect is worth mentioning: cases where, in accordance with the sectoral rules 
applicable  or with  the  legal  commitment  (e.g.  certain  international  agreements),  the 
budgetary commitment is made in annual tranchcs.  This is the case with the Structural 
Funds,  for  instance,  where  multiannual  legal  obligations  (Community  support 
frameworks) are not covered in the entirety by a budgetary commitment, but by partial 
budgetary  commitments.  The  same  would  apply  to  trans-European  networks  in  the 
Commission's last proposal. 
The  possibility  of splitting  budgetary  commitments  is  not  offered  by  the  Financial 
Regulation but by specific regulations (e.g. the Structural Funds regulation).  Article 1  (  4) 
of the  Financial  Regulation  doc:s,  however,  state:  "Commitment  appropriations  shall 
cover, for the current financial year, the total cost of  the legal obligations entered into for 
operations whose implementation extends over more than one financial year". 
In  order to  bring the  Financial Regulation  into  harmony  with  the  sectoral provisions 
which  authorise  the  use  of annual  tranches,  the  Commission  takes  the  view  that  the 
Financial Regulation should make explicit provision for  the possibility of splitting up 
budgetary commitments when the legal obligation exceeds a certain amount and when it 
extends over a number of  budget years, the two parameters to be specified in the sectoral 
regulation  applicable.  This  splitting  of  the  budgetary  commitment  should  be 
incorporated  in  the  legal  instrument concluded with  the  third  party,  so  that  the  legal 
commitment will coincide with the budgetary commitment.  The Commission believes 
that in these circumstances the splitting of the budgetary commitment is justified by the 
principle of sound financial management. 
39 TOPIC THREE 
DEFINITION OF ACCOUNTING PRINCIPLES 
A.  Accounts 
It is the Commission's intention that the Financial Regulation should state the principles 
governing the keeping of accounts and the presentation of financial  statements with a 
distinction being made between budget accounts and general accounts.  It also suggests 
reviewing the provision relating to  reporting on the  implementation of the budget, to 
bring it into line with actual practice, and to improve the drafting of  the provisions on the 
presentation of  accounts. 
(a)  Accounting nrincinles 
The Commission does not think that it would be sufficient to define accounting principles 
by simply referring to the fourth and seventh accounting directives which are concerned 
with  the  accounts  of private  companies.  The  Commission  is  more  in  favour  of 
identifying in the Financial Regulation, by reference to  generally accepted accounting 
principles and the Community accounting directives where they are relevant to the public 
service  context,  the  principles  on which  the  general  accounts  (as  defined  below)  are 
based: 
•  the principle of  continuity of  activities, 
•  the principle of  prudence which means assets are not overvalued and liabilities arc not 
undervalued, 
•  the principle of  consistent accounting methods, 
•  balance sheet data must be understandable, relevant, reliable and comparable from one 
year to the next, so as to give a true and fair picture of  the financial situation. 
(b)  Distinction between general accounts and hudget accounts 
The Financial Regulation should state that the accounts are made up of general accounts 
and budget accounts.  The general accounts, using the double entry method, record all 
revenue and expenditure for the year and are  designed to  give a picture of assets and 
liabilities in the form of a balance sheet at 31  December.  They must be assets-oriented. 
The general  accounts could also  comprise,  as  set out in the section on the system of 
appropriations  (Topic Two),  analytical  accounts which would establish the  accounting 
framework  to  serve  as  a  basis  for  assessing,  in  accordance  with Article 2  Fin.  Reg., 
whether the resultant benefits are in proportion to the resources applied. 
The budget  accounts,  on  the  other hand,  arc  used  for  detailed  monitoring of budget 
implementation and are used to produce the revenue and expenditure account and the 
reports  on  implementation  of the ·budget  referred  to  in  Article 34  of the  Financial 
Regulation. 
40 (c)  Reporting on imnlcmcntation of the hudgct 
Article 34 of the  Financial Regulation  should  be amended to  take  account of current 
reporting practices on budget implementation:  transmission to  the budgetary authority 
and to  the Court of monthly figures  for  all  appropriations, aggregated at chapter level 
with  information  about  the  utilisation of appropriations  carried  over,  made  available 
·again and re-used and transmission of a report on implementation to the same institutions 
three times a year. 
(d)  Presentation of the accounts 
Articles 78  et seq  should  make  a  clearer  distinction  between  the  various  types  of 
information  making  up  the  financial  statements:  analysis  of financial  management, 
revenue and expenditure account and balance sheet. 
It  is  suggested  that  the  Financial  Regulation  should  specify  the  purpose  of the 
institutions' financial statements.  This' purpose is to: 
present the nature of  their activities; 
explain the arrangements for financing their activities; 
- provide information on the way in which operations have been carried out. 
The Financial Regulation should also state that in order to provide a true and fair picture 
the financial statements must meet the requirements of: 
clarity, 
- comprehensibility, 
- comparability from one year to the next, 
- relevance of  the information. 
The Financial Regulation should also state that the revenue and expenditure account and 
consolidated  balance  sheet  arc  published  in  the  Official  Journal  together  with  the 
statement of assurance issued by the Court of Auditors in accordance with Article 188c 
of  the Treaty. 
(c)  Harmonisation of accounting methods between institutions 
The Commission would point out that an interinstitutional agreement on inventories will 
be concluded in  1998.  It has been negotiated between the  accounting officers of the 
institutions  by  the  Commission's  accounting  officer  on  the  basis  of the  inventory 
regulation adopted by the Commission on 22 January 1997.  The Commission accounting 
officer will also provide the accounting officers of the other institutions in 1998 with an 
accounting and consolidation manual. 
B.  Definition of advances and payments on account 
41 The Commission has found,  as has the Court, that various instruments of financial law 
(and not just the Financial Regulation) usc the concepts of advances and payments on 
account interchangeably (e.g. regulations on the Structural Funds).  These arc, however, 
different concepts and there is a need for clarification. 
The Commission believes that the confusion comes from  the fact that both are flat-rate 
part-payments which,  taken  in  isolation,  do  not  correspond  to  any  supply or service 
which can be identified in its entirety. 
Payments  on  account  arc  definitive,  part-payments  made  either  in  a  contractual 
framework  or under  an  obligation  laid  down  in  a  regulation.  As  the  payments  are 
definitive, the funds become the property of the third party.  Of course, if  the third party 
fails to perform the counterpart obligations properly, he will have to repay the institution 
an  equivalent  amount,  plus  any  interest,  in accordance  with  the  rules  governing  the 
relationship with the institution. 
Advances, on the other hand, are amounts temporarily made available to a beneficiary to 
cover expenditure incurred  in performing an  activity on behalf of the  institution (e.g. 
advances on mission expenses, imprests or technical assistance bureaus - such as those 
used under ECIP, MEDIA and similar programmes- for payments they must make to 
final  beneficiaries, where the sums they receive in  consideration for their services are 
definitive payments and hence, where appropriate, payments on account are made).  In· 
such cases beneficiaries must account for the correct use of this amount which remains 
the property of  the institution. 
In this connection payments under the EAGGF and the Structural Funds can be treated as 
payments on account, as can preliminary payments to  subcontractors for implementing 
certain Community policies, provided that, in the latter case, amounts still to be paid to 
final beneficiaries are entered as assets outside the balance sheet. 
The  distinction  is  essential  as  regards  interest  yielded,  since,  as  a  rule,  interest  on 
advances accrues to  the Community whereas interest on payments on account does not 
(see below).  It is also important for the purposes of  the accounts (Article 71  Fin. Reg.). 
All the institutions' financial rules and regulations should be reviewed from this angle. 
C.  Treatment of interest 
If the above line is taken (interest will accrue to whoever owns the funds generating the 
interest), the only problem which would still appear to exist is that of  where such interest 
should  be  booked,  as  the  Court  maintains  that  in  all  cases  it  should  constitute 
miscellaneous revenue. 
The Commission believes that the decision on where it should be booked should be taken 
on a case-by-case basis,  bearing in  mind the incentive this can provide for  improving 
management.  In  the  case  of  advances  paid  to  subcontractors,  for  instance,  the 
Commission  has  preferred  to  allocate  such  interest  to  the  projects  in  question 
(Article 22(4a) new, seventh series). 
It would seem more consistent with sound and efficient management for interest yielded 
by sums intended  for  a  specific  measure  to  benefit  this  measure  as  this  would  incite 
42 authorising  officers  to  try  to  cam  as  much  interest  as  possible.  The  amount  and 
disbursement  schedule  of  funds  should,  where  appropriate,  take  account  of  this 
assignment of  interest. 
D.  !:&.mnuterised procedures 
Computerised tools will be playing an ever bigger role in budget implementation.  The 
Commission believes  that  Article 23  of the  Financial  Regulation  is  the  best place  to 
accommodate  this  development  as  regards  supporting  documents  and  signatures  or 
approvals,  since this  provision refers  to  the  more  detailed  rules  to  be inserted  in  the 
implementing rules for the Financial Regulation. 
The Court makes the point that computerisation of management must not result in its 
right of  access to supporting documents being restricted. 
This legitimate concern of the  Court  docs  not,  in  the  Commission's view,  require  an 
amendment to the Financial Regulation but should be dealt with in an  agre~ment between 
the two institutions with due regard for their respective responsibilities. 
E.  Payment times 
The issue 
The communication which the Commission adopted on 10 June 1997 on "payment times 
and default interest" (SEC(97) 1205 final) calls on DG XIX to "present a draft proposal 
for  the  revision of the Financial Regulation  and,  if necessary,  its  implementing rules 
which will enshrine the right of creditors who arc  not paid on time to  receive interest. 
The Commission will at the same time consider whether this might be extended to cover 
all types of  relations between the institutions and third parties, along the lines of  practice 
in the Member States"8 (point 16 ofthe communication). 
The Commission is also planning to bring the arrangements applicable to payments made 
by the institutions into line with what will be provided in the directive on late payments 
in commercial transactions which, in the Commission's proposal (COM(1998) 126 final) 
imposes  tougher  conditions  as  regards  due  dates  (60 days  from  the  date  of invoice, 
21  days in the case of  written contracts) and interest (ECB rate plus 8 percentage points). 
A new provision should therefore be added to the Financial Regulation on payment times 
and interest due from the Community in the event of  late payment. 
This might involve no more than stating the principle of a due date and of payment of 
interest where the payment time is  exceeded, the length of the payment period and the 
interest rate being specified in the implementing rules for the Financial Regulation. 
8  It  should be noted  that  "practice  in  the  Member States"  referred  to  in  the  communication  is  not 
uniform.  Some  Member  States  provide  for  payment  of interest  only  in  certain  areas  (public 
procurement: L, tax refunds:  B)  whereas others provide for  it  in  all  areas (F,  IRL) or even make  it 
automatic (E). 
43 The  Commission  proposes  that  the  scope  of  the  abovementioned  Commission 
communication should be extended to cover all payments, officials and public authorities 
being at present excluded from entitlement to interest on late payments. 
44 TOPIC FOUR 
RULES GOVERNING CONTRACTS, DELEGATION OFT  ASKS AND GRANTS 
A.  Contracts 
With a  view to  rationalisation  and  greater consistency in the  Community institutions' 
procedures for the award of  contracts, the Commission considers that the main provisions 
on this subject in the Financial Regulation should, by analogy, be more firmly based on 
the  directives  on  public  contracts  and  the  Agreement  on  Government  Procurement 
concluded within the WTO. 
In accordance with its communication on public procurement in the European Union of 
11  March 1998 (COM(1998) 143  final),  the Commission will explore possible ways of 
monitoring  more  closely compliance with  the  principles  and rules  applying  to  public 
procurement. 
(a)  The role of the ACPC 
The  Advisory  Committee  on  Procurement  and  Contracts  (ACPC)  was  set  up  by the 
Financial Regulation at  a time  when  the  public contracts  directives  did  not  exist  and 
when it seemed appropriate to  have a centralised,  collective instrument to  watch over 
contracts planned by authorising officers in each institution, with a view to harmonising 
procurement practices and policies. 
Since then additional legislation on procurement has been passed at  Community level 
(public contracts directives) and world level (Agreement on Government Procurement) 
and the role of  the authorising officer has been enhanced.  In this new environment, what 
the ACPC docs is  now more of a check that procurement procedures arc in order and 
comply with the regulations. 
Given  this  fundamental  change,  the  Commission  believes  that  the  time  has  come  to 
consider whether the special ACPC procedure actually needs to  continue or whether it 
should not be changed to a support and advisory service for authorising officers.  What is 
more,  the current review of the  Commission's organisational structure could result  in 
far-reaching  changes  to  present  procedures.  All  this  could  require  changes  to  the 
arrangements under Article 63 Fin. Reg. 
Should it be decided to retain the present procedure of  referring contracts to an ACPC as 
provided in  Article 63  Fin.  Reg.,  the  Commission would propose the  changes  ~et out 
below. 
(b)  Threshold for referral to the ACPC 
The Court recommends that consideration should be given to whether the threshold at 
which cases must be referred to the ACPC should be included in the Financial Regulation 
rather than the implementing rules. 
The Commission's general  view  is  that  the  thresholds  should be contained in  a  legal 
instrument which can be quickly adjusted when necessary. This position is shared by the 
45 legislator,  since  the  Financial  Regulation  refers  to  the  Regulation  laying  down  the 
implementing mlcs - a Commission Regulation - for the establishment of  thresholds. 
However, the Commission agrees with the Court about the importance of the threshold 
for  referral to  the ACPC.  The proposal  for  a  revision of the Regulation laying down 
detailed  mles for  the implementation of the Financial Regulation (part of the  seventh 
series of amendments) fixes this threshold at ECU 120 000. This new threshold will then 
be very close to  the ECU 133 914  (SDR 130 000)  fixed  for the publication of public 
service, public supply and public works contracts by European Parliament and Council 
Directive 97  /52/EC of 13  October 1997 and the Agreement on Government Procurement 
concluded within the World Trade Organisation (WTO). 
The Commission therefore suggests that the threshold for referral to the ACPC should be 
brought into line with the thresholds applied in the directives coordinating public service, 
supply and works contracts. 
(c)  ACPC-.JRC 
In  order  to  simplify  and  standardise  procedures  and  preserve  the  unity  of  the 
Commission's procurement policy, the Commission is planning, at the end of the current 
trial period, to abolish the specific ACPC for JRC activities (ACPC-JRC) as its continued 
existence is not justified by the specific nature of the contracts concluded by the JRC in 
relation to the activity of  other Directorates-General in the Commission. 
Furthermore, Article 92(4) of the Financial Regulation already insists that the ordinary 
ACPC  should  be  consulted  in  respect  of  the  JRC's  competitive  activities.  The 
Commission therefore proposes that the second indent of Article 97(1) of the Financial 
Regulation (and Article 116 of the Regulation laying down implementing mles) on the 
ACPC-JRC should be deleted. 
(d)  Aholition of snccific thresholds 
The  threshold  for  referral  of contracts  financed  from  research  and  technological 
development  appropriations to  the  ACPC could be brought into  line  with the  normal 
threshold for referral. 
Similarly, reference to specific limit values "determining the conditions for concluding 
contracts" could be deleted. The public contracts directives do not make any distinction 
between scientific and other contracts. 
This  amendment  would  require  deletion  of the  first  indent  of Article  97(1)  of the 
Financial  Regulation  (and  Article 110  of the  Regulation  laying  down  implementing 
mles). 
(c)  Abolition of the ACPC's nowers in connection with the nurchase of buildings 
For  the  record  (as  this  matter  comes  essentially  under  the  Regulation  laying  down 
detailed  mles  for  the  implementation  of the  Financial  Regulation),  the  Commission 
considers that purchases of immovable property should no longer need to be referred to 
the ACPC (Article 63 Fin. Reg., Article lll(a) of the implementing mles) in view of  the 
46 limited number of these contracts and the interdepartmental buildings procedure which 
exists. 
It should also be pointed out that the public contracts directives and the Agreement on 
Government Procurement do not apply to this type of  contract. 
(f)  Award of contracts on an interinstitutional hasis 
The  provisions  entered  in  the  Financial  Regulation  in  1990  (second  paragraph  of 
Article 63) and in the implementing rules in 1993 (Articles 117 to  121) did not lead to the 
establishment of an interinstitutional ACPC for contracts common to  all the institutions 
because  of the  rigidity  resulting  from  its  composition  and  the  procedure  for  its 
implementation.  For  the  purposes  of transparency,  the  Commission  proposes  that 
Article 63  of the  Financial  Regulation  be  amended  and  Articles  117  to  121  of the 
implementing  rules  be  deleted  so  that  a  different  framework  may  be  provided  for 
contracts  which  arc  common  to  a  number  of institutions.  Two  solutions  could  be 
considered in this connection. 
The  first  solution,  which  the  Commission  prefers  for  reasons  of interinstitutional 
cooperation, would be to appoint one institution to take the lead role in the procedure for 
awarding a  contract which is  common to  a ni1mbcr  of institutions.  The ACPC of the 
institution  appointed  would  act  as  the  interinstitutional  ACPC  and  be  assisted  by  a 
representative from the ACPC of  each of  the institutions involved in the contract. 
The second solution, going no further than the mutual recognition of  opinions, would be 
to stipulate that the lead institution would give an opinion common to  the institutions 
involved  in  the  contract.  The  ACPCs  of the  other  institutions  involved  would  be 
informed of  the common opinion and would no longer have to express an opinion of  their 
own on the contract. 
(g)  Procedure for the submission of tenders 
For the record (as this matter comes under the Regulation laying down detailed rules for 
the  implementation  of  the  Financial  Regulation),  the  Commission  considers  that 
Article 103 of the implementing rules should also take account of the growing use made 
of private or semi-public messenger services in the submission of tenders and that the 
date on which the tender is submitted should then be specified. 
B.  Delegation of tasl{s to outsiders 
In the section on "misuse of subcontracting", the Court criticises the delegation of  public 
authority powers to outsiders such as consultants or technical assistance bureaus. 
Now that Article 22(2a) has been inserted under the seventh series of amendments to 
reserve  the  exercise  of  public  service  tasks  to  the  Community  institutions,  the 
Commission considers that  the  delegation  of tasks  to  outsiders  has  become far  more 
restrictive in content. 
It  should  therefore be examined whether the concept of tasks  involving  the European 
public service conforms to the current reflections on technical assistance bureaus. 
47 The Commission will ensure in its internal instructions (code of  conduct on outside staff) 
and in its contracts that the only tasks entrusted to outside persons arc those which may 
be delegated. 
C.  Award of grants 
The Commission suggests that a specific title be inserted in the Financial Regulation for 
the award of  grants. 
The contents arc based on the Commission communication of 14 July 1998 on the award 
and  monitoring of Community  grants.  The  Commission  suggests  that  the  following 
points be included: 
(a)  Definition of the concept of grant support: a grant is any direct non-commercial 
payment by the Community to promote a European Union policy. This definition 
excludes  expenditure  on  the  institution's  staff,  loans  and  participations,  and 
contracts. 
(b)  Statement of the  award principles: transparency, ex ante  publication, ex post 
publication  of  grants  awarded,  non-exclusive  access  to  grants,  collective 
assessment of proposals  by  a  committee  made  up  of the  institution's  staff; 
exceptions in cases of  spontaneous grants in connection with innovatory and pilot 
projects. In the ex post publicity of  grants awarded, all spontaneous grants will be 
identified. 
(c)  Principles of programming and legal base. Reference to  this legal base for the 
award procedure, the actual procedure will continue to come under the sectoral 
regulations,  with  due  allowance  for  the  wide  range  of fields.  The  Financial 
Regulation will have to  lay down standard rules for  grants  for  cases where the 
legal base says nothing about the award criteria. 
(d)  Principle of co-financing by the recipient bodies; exceptions for  bodies which 
pursue an objective of general European interest and which are mentioned in the 
budget comments, and for indirect research action. 
(c)  The Court's control of recipients of  grants is already governed by Article 87 Fin. 
Reg., but provisions must also be laid down for the control to be exercised by the 
institution awarding the grant. 
48 TOPIC FIVE 
CLEARER DEFINITION OF THE ROLE OF THOSE INVOLVED IN 
JMPI~EMENTATION 
Changes in the role of the three players 
The Community budget is implemented in accordance with the principle that the functions 
ofthe three officials involved arc separate: the authorising officer, the financial controller 
and the accounting officer arc mentioned in the Treaty itself (Article 209(c)) and their 
positions arc independent and mutually incompatible. 
In accordance with the second paragraph of Article 21  of the Financial Regulation, the 
appropriations arc administered by the authorising officer who alone is empowered to enter 
into commitments regarding expenditure, establish entitlements to be collected and issue 
recovery  orders  and  payment  orders.  The  authorising  officer  thus  initiates  budget 
implementation;  he  is  the  starting  point  for  all  decisions  relating  to  the  usc  of the 
appropriations entered in the budget. 
Once the decision has been taken and given concrete shape with the issue of  commitment 
proposals, payment orders, forward estimates and recovery orders, the financial controller 
has to  give a guarantee to  the institi1tion which appointed him that all  these operations 
comply with the principl~s and rules governing implementation of  the Community budget. 
Under the mles in force,  the  financial  controller's  intervention  takes  the  form  of prior 
approval of  all the financial operations conducted by the authorising officer. 
The purpose ofthis prior approval is to ensure that the instrument in question complies with 
a  number of principles depending on the  type of instrument  (Article 28(1)  for  forward 
estimates,  28(2) for  recovery orders,  38  for  commitment proposals and  47  for payment 
orders). 
Once approved by the  financial  controller,  the  operation  is  recorded by the  accounting 
officer, who keeps the accounts and  who is  also responsible for collection and payment 
(third paragraph of  Article 21 ). 
Historical  developments  and  the  rules  governing  these  three  players  divide  the  main 
responsibility between the authorising officer, as the person taking all the decisions on the 
usc of  appropriations, and the financial controller, who, by checking operations in complete 
independence, must approve each of these operations. The accounting officer checks that 
payments do constitute a discharge (Article 51  of the Financial Regulation) and guarantees 
the objectiveness of the accounts (a role recognised only in the implementing mles).  His 
role is thus limited to actually carrying out the operations prepared for him by the other two 
players. 
Authorising officer 
The reforms planned by the Commission in this field, which arc broadly in keeping with the 
approach proposed by the  Court,  are  targeted  primarily on the  authorising  officer.  The 
authorising officer will, of course, retain responsibility for decision-making in connection 
49 with revenue and expenditure involving the usc of appropriations placed at his disposal by 
the budgetary authority. However, he will no longer be able to rely on a systematic control 
of all his actions by another official. In other words, the authorising officer will assume the 
main responsibility for the legality of  his actions and for compliance with the principles of 
sound  financial  management  since  he will  no  longer  be  sure  that  his  actions  will  be 
reviewed by the financial controller before they take effect. The Commission has taken a 
step in this direction under SEM 2000 by setting up financial units in all the Directorates-
General to act as a financial counterweight to decisions taken by the operational units and 
thus serve as an initial filter within the authorising department itself. 
In  particular,  and  taking  account  of the  financial  controller's  new  role  as  the  official 
responsible for the institution's internal audit, the authorising officer must be fully liable for 
decisions on the commitment and payment of expenditure and the proper establishment of 
entitlements  by ensuring  that  these  operations  are  fully  consistent  with  the  Financial 
Regulation. 
If  different persons carry out different parts of  the commitment operation (i.e. the decision, 
legal and accounting aspects - sec Section B of Topic Two above), the responsibilities of 
each person must be defined since it may be that only one of these three components is 
called into question. 
Fin;mcial controller 
The current system of systematic prior approval, which also involves a certain dilution of 
responsibility (the authorising officer can rely on the financial controller having approved 
the  operation  proposed)  and  the  overlapping  of control  powers  between  the  financial 
controller and the accounting officer (particularly as regards the control of  payment orders), 
is now changing with the modernisation of  management and the introduction of electronic 
bookkeeping. There is a definite need for these changes in view of  the annual growth in the 
number of  operations to be processed. 
In  the  seventh  series  of amendments,  the  Commission  has  proposed  making  explicit 
provision  for  the  possibility that  the  financial  controller  may  conduct  prior control  of 
operations by means of sample checks, while allowing him the right to restore or maintain 
systematic advance control in high-risk sectors. The financial controller is also given the 
broader role as the institution's internal auditor. 
Once the  Council has  adopted the  seventh  series  of amendments,  the  prior approval of 
commitment proposals and payments orders can be based on a sample check. In high-risk 
sectors the control of  commitments and payments will be systematic. 
The  financial  controller  is  thus  changing  his  control  instruments,  abandoning  the 
compulsory filter  for  all  instruments in  favour of a minimum filter system and controls 
based more on the effectiveness of  the management systems used by the authorising officer 
and  accounting officer.  Logically,  this  change should have  repercussions  for  the  other 
players  in  budget  implementation  since  it  will  lead  to  clarification  of their  respective 
powers. 
Accounting officer 
50 In  view,  amongst  other things,  of the  responsibilities  of the  authorising  officer and  the 
financial controller in this area, the accounting officer's responsibility for the objectiveness 
of the accounts should be redefined to cover all aspects of their reliability. He should also 
have the powers necessary to ensure that they are reliable.  These powers assumed a special 
dimension with the introduction of  the statement of  assurance by the Maastricht Treaty and 
will be further enhanced by the Amsterdam Treaty, which makes the statement one of the 
items to be taken into account for the discharge. 
Apart from the accounting officer's involvement in drawing up  the inventories and local 
management systems used by the authorising officers (see proposal on the seventh series of 
amendments  to  the Financial Regulation),  the mles should  take  account of the controls 
which arc already conducted automatically by the management system (SINCOM) under 
the accounting officer's authority, as in the case of  the availability of  appropriations. 
The accounting officer should be  in  a position to  ensure  that  payment constitutes  valid 
discharge,  for  the  proper registration  of commitments,  forward  estimates  and  recovery 
orders,  for  the  validation,  registration  and  proper  execution  of payments,  for  treasury 
management,  for  the  collection  of  revenue  and  recovery  of  entitlements,  for  the 
management of  the third parties ledger, for the reliability and objectiveness of  bookkeeping 
and ofthe presentation of  the financial statements and for the quality of  information in local 
management systems used  in  support of the  aggregated  data  in  the  budget and  general 
accounts. 
As  regards  recovery  of entitlements,  a  prov1s1on  should  be  entered  to  the  effect  that 
recovery should be effected in the first instance by setting the amount off against amounts 
due to the same beneficiary. 
51 TOPIC SIX 
MANAGEMENT OF EXTERNAL AID 
A.  Title IX of the Financial Regulation 
The issue 
Title  IX  Fin.  Reg.  is  based  substantially  on  the  development  cooperation  policy 
conducted by DG VIII within the framework of the EDF, particularly when it  refers to 
national authorising officers and paying agents. These provisions have not been inspired 
by the new policies in favour of  central and eastern Europe, let alone by operations under 
the common foreign and security policy (see Section B below). 
It  cannot  be  denied  that  there  have  been  a  number  of management  problems  in 
connection with external relations. In particular, the Court notes the ambiguous wording 
of  the provisions of  Title IX relating to the award of  contracts and the fact that the Title is 
ill-suited for the procedures to  implement the Phare and Tacis programmes. As regards 
the latter point,  the  Commission stated in Agenda 2000 that  it  wished  to  continue to 
decentralise  implementation of external  aid  to  the  recipient  states  and  was  strongly 
supported by Parliament. 
As regards the procedures for the award of contracts, the Commission would point out 
that the current amendment of  the Financial Regulation (seventh series) brings the system 
for  the  award  of contracts  in  this  sector  into  line  with  the  obligations  which  the 
Community  entered  into  under  GATT,  resulting  in  a  stricter  framework  for  the 
application ofTitle IX. 
The  sectoral  regulations  in  this  field  (Phare,  Tacis,  Meda,  etc.)  also  contain  specific 
financial provisions which, as  a lex specialis, accompany and supplement the provisions 
of Title IX applying to the management of  external aid. Article 7 of the Tacis Regulation 
of 18 July 1993 and Article 8 of the Meda Regulation of23 July 1996 contain provisions 
on  the  award  of contracts  which  supplement  those  provided  for  by  Title IX  of the 
Financial Regulation. 
The  Commission  suggests  that  Title IX  of the  Financial  Regulation  be  amended  as 
regards  the  award  of contracts  by  introducing  two  improvements  to  eliminate  the 
ambiguities criticised by the Court: 
Section III of Title IX (Award of contracts) should be revised to state that the public 
contracts  directives  and  the  Agreement  on  Government  Procurement  may  be 
applicable. 
- Application of Article 119 of the Financial Regulation raises a number of difficulties 
in interpreting the term "contracts awarded in the interests ofthe Commission", which 
is a condition for the application of  the provisions contained in Section I of  Title IV of 
the  Financial  Regulation.  To overcome this  problem,  it  is  suggested  that  the  term 
52 "awarded in the interests of  the Commission" be replaced by different wording such as 
"awarded with a view to providing support for Commission departments". 
As regards the decentralised management of external aid, it should be pointed out that 
decentralising  implies  the  transfer  of the  powers  of budget  implementation  to  the 
authorities of the recipient states. The Commission will make an overall payment to the 
payment authority appointed by the recipient state and the aid will then be shared out by 
this state (call for tenders, award of contracts, payment to  final beneficiary) in the same 
way as the aid granted to the Member States under the Stmctural Funds. 
Decentralisation differs from devolution, which involves the delegation of the powers of 
authorising officer to Commission representatives in the recipient country instead of to 
officials  at  the institution's headquarters,  whereas  decentralisation  involves  delegating 
these powers direct to the authorities of the recipient country. While devolution does not 
require  changes  to  the  mles,  decentralisation  could  come  up  against  the  stmctural 
provisions of Title IX of the Financial Regulation, which docs not authorise the transfer 
of management powers to  the recipient state but only to  the EIB or other organisations 
and then only in part (Article 1  05(3)). 
To implement the aid, in the form of.financing agreements with the recipient states (as in 
the case of the accession partnerships), the Commission must approve each invitation to 
tender and each proposal for the award of  a contract (Articles 1  08(2) and 1  09(2) and (3)), 
which is not feasible  with the  volume of external  aid,  particularly in connection with 
enlargement. 
Finally, Article 111 (7) on the clearance of  payments made in local currency before being 
booked to the budget appropriations is ill-suited for direct payments. 
The Commission therefore suggests that a new section be inserted in Title IX authorising 
dccentraliscd management of external  aid  by way of exception to  the abovementioned 
provisions.  This  amendment  of Title IX  would  not  prevent  similar  provisions  on 
decentralisation from being incorporated in sectoral regulations on external aid. 
The Commission would also suggest expressly stating in Title IX that it also applies to 
the implementation of  humanitarian aid and humanitarian projects. 
B.  Common foreign and security policy 
The issue 
When  dealing  with  the  principle  of unity  (above),  the  Commission  stated  that  the 
Financial Regulation applied to  the  implementation of operating expenditure under the 
common foreign  and security policy and  cooperation in  the field  of justice and  home 
affairs whenever this expenditure is charged to the Community budget. The next question 
which arises is whether a specific title should be set up, whether the ordinary provisions 
should be applied or, in the case of  operating expenditure under the common foreign and 
security policy, whether Title IX applies. 
Suggestion 
53 The Commission's  view  is  that  expenditure  under  the  common  foreign  and  security 
policy and cooperation in the field of justice and home affairs should be subject to the 
general provisions of the Financial Regulation whenever this expenditure is  charged to 
the Community budget, without their being any need for a specific title. 
In the case of operating expenditure under the common foreign and security policy, the 
Commission considers that Title IX applies whenever this expenditure takes the form of 
external aid. The Commission would therefore suggest that Article 105(1) be amended to 
specify that Title IX applies in this case. 
54 IlL  PROBLEMS OF FORM 
55 TOPIC ONE 
IMPROVING PRESENTATION AND CLARITY 
A.  STRUCTURE AND DRAFTING OF THE FINANCIAL REGULATION 
(a)  Drafting of the Financial Regulation 
The drafting of the Financial Regulation needs to be reviewed since, like the budget for 
which it sets rules of establishment and implementation,  it  covers  the whole range of 
Community  activity  and  therefore  has  to  be  adjusted  when  activities  change  in 
accordance with amendments  to  the  Treaty.  Article  140  also  states  that  the  Financial 
Regulation  should  be  examined  at  three-year  intervals  to  bring  it  into  line  with  the 
budgetary and legislative situation. 
The problems  of drafting  which  need  to  be  examined  relate  to  the  structure  of the 
Financial Regulation and the clarity of  its drafting. 
(b)  Structure of the Financial Regulation 
The Financial Regulation is  currently divided into three extremely uneven parts. Part I 
(Provisions applicable to  the general budget of the European Communities) consists of 
133  articles and  12  titles,  some of which are  divided into  sections, Part II  (Provisions 
applicable to borrowing and lending operations by the European Communities) contains 
four articles and Part III (Transitional and final provisions) six articles. 
This stmcture can be improved in three ways: 
First, the present division into parts should be dropped, since this is not justified by the 
volume of  the articles in each part nor by the subject matter (the contents of Parts II and 
III are not substantially different from the subject matter dealt with in the titles ofPart I). 
A new Part I should then be restored containing only the provisions generally applicable 
("Common provisions").  Titles VII  to  XII of the current Part I and the  current Part II 
containing special provisions will form Part II ("Special provisions"). 
Finally,  reference  should be  made  to  the  standard structure laid down in the  Council 
resolution of 8 June  1993  on  the  quality of drafting of Community legislation,  which 
calls for a division into chapters, sections, articles, and paragraphs. 
From the point of view of structure, emphasis must also be placed on the coherence of 
Title 1 (General principles), which must define the objective of the Financial Regulation 
in  relation  to  the  objectives  mentioned in  Article 209 of the  Treaty  (establishing  and 
implementing  the  budget,  presenting  accounts,  responsibility  of officers,  auditing 
accounts), establish the principles and list the exceptions. 
(c)  Clarity of drafting 
In  this  case,  emphasis  must  be placed  on  the  definition  of the  terms  used  (e.g.  the 
meaning of the  word  budget  in  Article 1(1)  or the  word  payment  in  Article 51),  the 
56 division of articles  by subject matter (e.g.  Article 49  relating  to  the  interest owed by 
recipients of undue payments should not be included in the subsection on authorisation) 
and  the  identification  of  the  powers  of  all  officials  responsible  for  budget 
implementation. 
Cases of  needless repetition must also be eliminated.9 
(d)  Suggested presentation 
If  revised as suggested, the Financial Regulation would be structured as follows: 
TITLE I 
TITLE II 
TITLE III 
TITLE IV 
TITLE V 
TITLE VI 
TITLE VII 
TITLE I 
TITLE II 
PART I:  COMMON PROVISIONS 
GENERAL PROVISIONS (Articles 1 to 11, 26, 27 and 32) 
ESTABLISHMENT  AND  STRUCTURE  OF  THE  BUDGET  (former 
Articles 12 to 20) 
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE BUDGET (former Articles 21  to 55, with 
the exception of  Articles 26, 27 and 32) 
CONCLUSION  OF  CONTRACTS,  INVENTORIES,  ACCOUNTS 
(former Articles 56 to 72) 
RESPONSIBILITIES  OF  AUTHORISING  OFFICERS,  FINANCIAL 
CONTROLLERS,  ACCOUNTING  OFFICERS  AND  IMPREST 
ADMINISTRATORS (former Articles 73 to 77) 
PRESENTING AND AUDITING ACCOUNTS (Articles 78 to 90) 
TRANSITIONAL  AND  FINAL  PROVISIONS  (former  Articles  138 
to 143) 
PART II:  SPECIAL PROVISIONS 
SPECIAL  PROVISIONS  APPLICABLE  TO  THE  EUROPEAN 
AGRICULTURAL  GUIDANCE  AND  GUARANTEE  FUND, 
GUARANTEE SECTION (former Articles 98 to 104) 
SPECIAL  PROVISIONS  APPLICABLE  TO  FINANCIAL 
9  One example is the final subparagraph of Article 7(2) ("Provisional appropriations may not be carried 
over") which duplicates the second subparagraph of  Article 7(1) and should therefore be deleted. 
Another example is the second subparagraph of  Article 34(2) ("The budgetary authority may examine 
these  reports")  which duplicates  the  first  paragraph  which  states  that  the  report  should be  sent  to 
Parliament and the Council, i.e. the two arms of  the budgetary authority. 
57 TITLE III 
TITLE IV 
TITLE V 
TITLE VI 
TITLE VII 
PARTICIPATION BY THIRD PARTIES AND OUTSIDE BODIES IN 
COMMUNITY ACTIVITIES (former Articles 124 to  132) 
SPECIAL  PROVISIONS  APPLICABLE  TO  RESEARCH  AND 
TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT APPROPRIATION (Articles 91 
to 97) 
SPECIAL PROVISIONS APPLICABLE TO EXTERNAL AID (former 
Articles 1  05 to  120) 
SPECIAL PROVISIONS APPLICABLE TO THE MANAGEMENT OF 
APPROPRIATIONS RELATING TO STAFF SERVING IN OFFICES 
AND SUBOFFICES IN THE COMMUNITY AND IN DELEGATIONS 
OUTSIDE THE COMMUNITY AND TO THEIR ADMINISTRATION 
(former Articles 121  and 123) 
SPECIAL  PROVISIONS  RELATING  TO  THE  OFFICE  FOR 
OFFICIAL PUBLICATIONS  OF  THE  EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 
(former Article 133) 
PROVISIONS  APPLICABLE  TO  BORROWING  AND  LENDING 
OPERATIONS  BY  THE  EUROPEAN  COMMUNITIES  (former. 
Articles 134 to 137) 
B.  IMPRECISE FORMULATION 
The Financial Regulation  contains  a  number of expressions  that  could  be considered 
rather vague. 
The Court criticised these expressions in its opinion No 4/97 of 10 July 1997: "Many of 
the expressions it  uses  are  vague  or,  by their wording,  introduce  'grey'  areas  in  legal 
terms. Expressions such as 'in particular', 'where appropriate', 'if need be', 'as a rule', 'in 
principle', 'endeavour', 'exceptionally' and others of the same ilk arc to be found by the 
score. The main drawback of these expressions is that at the same time as laying down a 
rule, they also lay down the possibility of  derogating from it, without specifying the cases 
where such a derogation would be permitted." 
This  analysis  is  only  partly  correct.  The  Commission  shares  the  Court's  concern  to 
tighten up  the way in which the provisions of the Financial Regulation are  expressed. 
However, it should be pointed out that usc of the expressions noted by the Court can be 
justified on three grounds: 
- statement of exceptions to a principle, the only justification mentioned by the Court: 
when Article 7 states that appropriations not used at the end of a financial year "shall, 
as a rule, lapse", it is expressing a principle, that of budget annuality. The article then 
. sets out exceptions to  this principle ("however, a decision may be taken to carry over 
appropriations") and describes the circumstances under which the appropriations may 
be carried over. 
58 - explanation: when Article 4(3) states that the Commission may accept any donation 
made "and in particular foundations,  subsidies,  gifts  and  bequests", it explains this 
concept  by  taking  the  most  frequent  examples  as  an  illustration.  This  list  is  not 
exhaustive since the concept may cover a broad range of legal  forms  in accordance 
with the different national laws. 
- the difficulty of giving legal expression to a de facto situation. When Article 7(2)(a) 
refers  to  "operations  for  which  preliminaries  have  been  virtually  completed  at 
31  December but for  which  accounting  commitments  have  not  yet  been made",  the 
Financial Regulation is pinpointing an actual situation which, according to the legislator, 
requires  an  exception to  the principle of budget annuality in a case which cannot be 
described more precisely. 
In  the  other  cases  the  Commission  intends  to  suggest  stricter  and  thus  more  precise 
formulation. 
59 TOPICT\VO 
IMPROVED COORDINAIID_N_BETWEEN THE FINANCIAL REGULATION 
AND THE QTHER FINANCIAL PROVISIO~ 
A.  CONCEPT  OF  THE  .  .-Ell~.A~Clc\L._RE.G]lL.AIIDN  WITHIN  THE 
MEANING OF ARTICLE 209 OF lli.E TREATY 
In recommending in paragraph 12 of its Opinion No 4/97 that the primacy of  the Financial 
. Regulation in the hierarchy of the legal texts derived from the Treaties should be restored 
· ·and that the procedure stipulated in .t\rticle 209 of the Treaty should be respected for this 
purpose,  the Court is  suggesting that the concept of the Financial Regulation should be 
examined within the meaning of the Treaty. It should be noted in this cmmection that the 
Financial  Regulation  of 21 December  1977  implements  only  points  (a)  and  (c)  of 
Article 209  of  the  EC  Treaty  which  refer  to  the  procedure  for  establishing  and 
implementing the budget and for presenting and auditing accounts and to the responsibility 
of  authorising officers and accounting officers. Point {b), which relates to own resources, is 
covered  by a  different  regulation.  Although,  strictly speaking,  only  a regulation which 
specifies the procedure for establishing and implementing the budget and for presenting and 
auditing  accounts .should be .considered  a  Fimmcial  Regulation,  there  appears  to  be no 
justification for questioning·the method chosen to  implement Article 209. In other words, 
there is  some logic  in  incorporating  into  the  Financial  Regulation not  only the  subject 
matter referred  to  in Article'209(a) but  also  related  topics  coming under Article 209(c) 
(responsibility of the  Financial  Controller,  authorising officers  and  accounting  officers). 
However,' there is not the same link as regards own resources, which are only one specific 
aspect of  budget execution on the revenue side and which may legitimately be covered by 
an instmment other than the Finan~ial Regulation. 
Nor  would  there  appear  to  he  grounds  for  questioning  the  unity  of the  regulation 
implementing  points  (a)  and  (c)  of A1ticle 209,  as  there  were  before  the  Financial 
Regulation of 25 April  1973 which merged the then existing Financial Regulations on the 
establishment and  implementation of the budget and on the presentation and auditing of 
accounts. 10 Indeed, even if Article 209(a) refers to "financial regulations" in the plural, it is 
preferable, for reasons of transparency, to have a single instrument containing all the rules 
applicable to a single budget.  · 
The unity of the Financial Regulation is, however, undermined by the proliferation of 
budget provisions in  sec~  oral regulations such as Regulation No 729/70 of  21  April 1970 
on the financing of the common agdcultural policy and Regulation No 2052/88 of 24 June 
1988  on  the  tasks  of the  Structural  Funds  which  contain  financial  provisions  on 
10  Financial Reg11iations: 
- of 30  July  1968  on  the  f~stablislirnent ·and· implementation  of ·the  budget  of the  European 
Communities and. on  the  responsibili~y of :mtlwrising ofti1:crs  and accounting officers  (OJ  L  199, 
! 0. 8. 1968); 
- of 15  Dec::mher 1969  laying dcwn th~ procedures for prcsentir.g and ~uJiting accounts (OJ L 326, 
29.12.1969)  . 
60 commitments, payments and controls. II The same considerations apply mutatis mutandis to 
external  relations  and the ever-increasing volume of sectoral  rules  governing them (e.g. 
management of  the Phare and Tacis programmes). 
This leads to the question of  whether these specific provisions should be incorporated in the 
Financial Regulation, which would in the first place require the establishment of  a list. The 
obvious desire for consistency would call for this solution although practical reasons (not to 
call  into question sectoral  rules based on separate legal bases) recommend the opposite 
solution, which is what is proposed. At all events, the sectoral rules, as./ex specialis, must 
not run counter to the Financial Regulation and, where applicable, should be linked to it. 
A  similar  question  which  arises  is  whether  the  provisions  contained  in  political 
instruments  such  as  the  interinstitutional  agreements  and  the  joint  declarations 
should be incorporated in the Financial Regulation. The main provisions concerned are 
the  joint  declaration  of 30 June  1982  on  various  measures  to  improve  the  budgetary 
procedure and the Interinstitutional Agreement of  29 October 1993 on budgetary discipline 
and  improvement of the budgetary procedure. These provisions relate to  topics  coming 
under the Financial Regulation (budgetary procedure, the distinction between compulsory 
and  non-compulsory  expenditure,  legal  bases),  but  in  general  they  arc  not  legal 
instrumcnts12 and arc not adopted in accordance with the same procedure as the Financial 
Regulation, the Court not being involved.  There  thus  appears  to  be no  justification for 
including these provisions in the Financial Regulation. The impact which amendments to 
the  Interinstitutional  Agreement  have  on the  Financial  Regulation  and  which  must  be 
incorporated in it is another matter. 
B.  LINKS  BETWEEN  THE  FINANCIAL  REGULATION  'AND  OTHER 
FINANCIAL PROVISIONS 
The Financial Regulation is the basic instrument of secondary legislation for financial and 
budgetary law. It is intended to given further regulatory detail to  the financial  provisions 
contained in Article 188c (the Court's external audit powers) and Articles 199 to 209 of  the 
Treaty. 
There appears to be no reason for criticising the wording of  the Financial Regulation on this 
point. Any duplication between the Treaty and the Financial Regulation (e.g. the principle 
of annuality set out in Article 203(1) of the Treaty is repeated in Article 6 of the Financial 
Regulation)  can  be justified by the  desire  for  internal  consistency within the Financial 
Regulation. 
Attention should be drawn in this connection to cases where the provisions of  the Financial 
Regulation on the procedure for the establishment of the budget refer to provisions in the 
Treaty. Article 9 refers to Article 204 as  regards provisional twelfths, Article  15  refers to 
Article .203 as regards the procedure for establishing supplementary and amending budgets, 
Article 16 refers to the same provision for the ordinary budget and Article 17 again refers to 
II  See also Tugendhat-Murphy agreement on the consultation of the Court of  Auditors under Article 209 
of the Treaty on any provision derogating from the Financial Regulation. 
12  See Case 34/86 Council v Parliament: [1986] ECR 2155. 
61 the same provision for adoption of  the budget. These references appear justified for reasons 
of  economy (there is no point in reproducing the text of the Treaty which is exhaustive on 
these points). 
Links between the Financial Regulation and the implementing rules raise the  same 
type of problem. Many of the provisions in the Regulation laying down the implementing 
rules reproduce the text of  the Financial Regulation (e.g. Article 52 takes over Article 36(2) 
of the Financial Regulation).  This question must be examined should the  implementing 
rules be rewritten.  On the other hand,  the Financial Regulation sometimes refers  to  the 
implementing rules in connection with basic questions which are  only mentioned in the 
Financial  Regulation  (e.g.  Article 123  of the  Financial  Regulation  on  administrative 
appropriations outside the Community) or dealt with in brief (Articles 69  to  72  on the 
accounts). In both these cases, the provisions contained in the implementing rules should be 
incorporated  in  the  Financial Regulation.  In any  event,  the  implementing rules  will  be 
reviewed after the reworked Financial Regulation is adopted. 
62 